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I. INTRODUCTION

Insolvency and debt restructuring are common aspects of credit-driven economies,
especially during times of economic recession.' Recent growth in the number of
transnational business enterprises will inevitably lead to increased cross-border insolvencies
and multinational debt restructuring. Although nearly all countries have developed legal
structures for dealing with domestic insolvencies,3 if the debtor's assets are in multiple
countries at the time. of insolvency, there is little legal guidance for creditors, debtors, or
practitioners.
In most countries, bankruptcy is both a procedural and a substantive law device which,
in turn, depends on and affects corporate law, property law, the law of securities, personal
law, and sometimes even criminal and public law.' Therefore, the development of a general
approach to international insolvency 6 requires a structured, yet flexible, method for
achieving international cooperation. 7

1 J. DALHUISEN, DALHuSiEN ON INTERNATIONALINSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY, § 1.01, 1-1 (1986).
1.
"Insolvency laws proper are mainly products of a more advanced economy in which there is a fairly refined
system of contract law with more elaborate and abstract notions of individual rights and obligations enforced,
if the need arises, by a ce.ntral power." Id. at 1-1, 2. The author suggests that the achievement of such systems
presupposes the replacement of tribal hierarchy with that of the state. Id. at 1-2. Through gradual development,
the first centralized insolvency system probably arose in Rome during the reign of Emperor Augustus (63 B.C.14 A.D.) since "[b]y then, the economic activities and contractual arrangements also required a system of
insolvency rules beyond mere local and incidental remedies against the defaulting debtor based on personal
constraint and infliction of harm. The proceedings thus became gradually directed towards satisfaction out of
[the] debtor's estate undt.r a uniform set of laws and private remedies against his person were abolished." Id.
2.
Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism In Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 457 (1991). "The surging growth of transnational enterprise presents the prospect
of capitalism writ large, with all its benefits and terrors. One inevitable consequence is the emergence of
worldwide defaults." Id. Donald R. Joseph, InternationalWorkouts andBankruptcies:Additional Considerations
in WORKOUTS AND TuRNAROUNDS: THE HANDBOOK OF RESTRUCTURINO AND INvESTINO IN DiSTRESsED
CoMPANjES 719, 719-20 (DiNapoli et. al., ed. 1989).
3. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 458 n.4.
See Rona R. Mears, Cross-Border Insolvencies in the 21st Century: A Proposalfor International
4.
Cooperation, I INT'L INSOLVENCY REP. 23, 26-27 (1990). Though international insolvency cooperation is
seemingly a proper subject for an international convention, historically attempts to draft bilateral or multilateral
treaties have been unsaccessful. ALdat 26, n.7 (citing Draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up,
Arrangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings (1980)), reprintedin 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6111
(March 31, 1981) [hereinafter Draft Convention]; Draft of U. S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty (October 29, 1979)
[hereinafter Draft of U.S.-Canada Treaty], reprinted in 2 J. DALHuIsEN, DALH-JISEN ON INTERNATIONAL,
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTcY, n.3 at app. D-6A-1 to 6A-13 (1986).
1 DALHUISEN, supra note 1, § 2.01[4], at 3-125.
5.
6. For purposes of this Comment, the term "international insolvency" means "all of those various
proceedings under all types of law in various jurisdictions worldwide, applicable to actions regarding financial
failure generally, including insolvency bankruptcy, reorganization, composition, rehabilitation and any other such
proceeding by whatever name." IBA COMM. J, SEcT. ON BusINESs LAW, MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
CO-OPERATION ACT (MIICA), misc. cmt. subsec. (1) (Official Comments) (3d draft, 1989), reprintedin John
A. Barret & Timothy E. Powers, ProposalforConsultativeDraftofModel InternationalInsolvency Cooperation
Act for Adoption by Domestic Legislation With or Without Modification, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 323, 327 (JulyAug. 1989) [hereinafter MICA]. MIICA is reprinted with permission and attached hereto as appendix A.
1 DALHUISEN, supra note 1, § 2.01[4], at 3-125.
7.
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International insolvency law has been described as "a catchphrase for the rules that are
supposed to govern the case of an insolvent debtor who has assets in more than one
country."' There are no multinational treaties or institutions governing international
insolvencies and this situation is unlikely to change in the near future. 9 This void in
multinational insolvency law may be due to businesses' and creditors' reluctance to accept
the possibility of insolvency and to a lack of incentive for global governmental cooperation
in a matter traditionally deemed private."
Much of the tension surrounding the resolution of international insolvencies stems from
the fact that most countries contemplate universal recognition of their domestic insolvency
proceedings, yet they afford limited recognition to foreign proceedings." For example, the
United States Bankruptcy Code section 541(a) defines the debtor's estate to include all
property of the debtor "wherever located." 12 This broad language has been interpreted to
mean that even assets located outside the United States are property of the estate and
therefore, should be administered by the United States bankruptcy court. 3
In contrast, with respect to local assets and creditors, most countries either give no
recognition or, at most, limited and incoherent recognition to the stays of collection activities
associated with pending foreign insolvency proceedings. 14 In 1978, the United States took
an arguably progressive approach to recognizing the extraterritorial effect of foreign
insolvencies by enacting Bankruptcy Code section 304."' Section 304 gives courts
discretion to determine, on a case by case basis, whether to permit assets located in the
United States to be administered in a pending foreign insolvency proceeding.' 6 Though the
drafters of this section had hoped to induce international reciprocity, the bankruptcy laws of
17
other countries continue to lack similar provisions.
As previously mentioned, there is no coherent framework for resolving multinational
insolvencies, even with our most established and sophisticated trading partners. The

8.
Kurt H. Nadelmann, RehabilitatingInternationalBankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and
Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1977).
9. Draft Convention, supra note 4; Draft of U.S.-Canada Treaty, supranote 4, at app. D-6A-1 to 6A-13.
Cf. The Scandinavian Convention 155 L.N.T.S. 115 (1933); The Bustamente Code of Private International Law
86 L.N.T.S. 246, 362 (1928).
10. Mears, supra note 4, at 26-27 (citing Timothy E. Powers & Rona R. Mears, Protecting a U.S.
Debtor'sAssets in InternationalBankruptcy: A Survey and Proposalfor Reciprocity, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REa. 303, 347-48 (1985)); Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flashen, The InternationalVoid in the Law of
MultinationalInsolvencies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307 (1987); see Richard A. Gitlin & Rona R. Meats, INTERNATIONAL
LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUprciEs (1989) (suggesting reasons for the void in international insolvency law).
11. Gitlin & Meats, supra note 10, at 308 n.8; Timothy E. Powers, Issues in International
Bankruptcy-The Relationship Between U.S. and ForeignBankruptcy Laws, 1991 BANKR. L. INST. 3, 5.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1990).
13. Ulrich Huber, CreditorEquality in TransactionalBankruptcies: The UnitesStates Position,19 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 772-73 nn.208-13 (1986); Joseph, supra note 2, at 722.
14. For a brief digest of various nations' laws pertaining to creditors' rights, see Gitlin & Mears, supra
note 10, at 111-364.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1992). "If anything, the United States'has been less parochial and more
accommodating than most other countries (developed and developing), but even in this country principles of
international bankruptcy administration remain nascent and primitive." Westbrook, supra note 2, at 721.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1992).
17. Powers & Meats, supra note 10, at 349. See generally Powers, supra note 11, at 6-9 (describing
methods for protecting the worldwide assets of a U.S. debtor in the absence of foreign provisions for recognition
of claims ancillary to pending U.S. bankruptcies).
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inconsistent outcomes in individual cases,18 the mounting costs of piecemeal
administrations,' 9 and the aggregate impact on international lending institutions and
commerce" has prompted practitioners and scholars to promote alternative proposals for
reform. These proposals include some options that have been suggested and even
(unsuccessfully) attempted for over a century, such as bilateral or multilateral treaties. 1
More recently, a committee of the International Bar Association proposed the Model
International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) which is intended to create a network of
reciprocal cooperation for international bankruptcy proceedings through uniform domestic
legislation. 22 Though MIICA is the most practical proposal for achieving reciprocal
cooperation between nations with respect to international insolvencies, it has not been
enacted by any country to date.
Part II of this Comment introduces specific legal problems associated with international
insolvencies, including various jurisdictional and choice of law issues in the context of a
hypothetical international insolvency. Part I analyzes current United States legislation,
including both positive and negative aspects of Bankruptcy Code section 304. Par IV
recognizes conflicting viewpoints on reciprocity requirements and identifies a method for
considering reciprocity within a comity analysis. Part V introduces MIICA and suggests that
it is the most practical proposal for promoting reciprocal international insolvency
cooperation. Finally, Part VI emphasizes the pivotal roles of courts and practitioners in
promoting reciprocal universality until either MIICA is enacted or international insolvency
treaties are negotiated.
II. TiE INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROBLEM

"A bankruptcy proceeding [becomes] an international bankruptcy when the assets and
creditors of [an] insolvent debtor are located in more than one country." 24 For example,
international bankruptcy law is implicated where a United States debtor files for Chapter 11
reorganization and seeks to freeze its assets, including those located outside the United

18. Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of Inconsistent
Approaches of United States Courts, 66 Am.BANKR. LJ. 135 passim (1992); Richard Hubbard, American
Recognition of InternationalInsolvency Proceedings:DecipheringSection 304(c), 9 BANKR. DEV. J.453, 461-70
(1992); c.f Pauline M. Stevens, The Interpretationof Foreign Bankruptcy Laws in Domestic ProceedingsUnder
H.R. 8200, 52 AM. BANKR. LJ. 61, 67 (1978) (illustrating inconsistency of non-bankruptcy proceedings
addressing extraterritorial effect of foreign insolvency judgments).
19. Multinational companies which become insolvent may be forced to adhere to conflicting bankruptcy
laws of numerous countries which "may lead to economic and legal chaos for creditors, debtors, and such
innocent third parties as consumers, investors and governments." Mears, supra note 4, at 25. More specifically,
the extension of credit to multinational companies may be adversely affected by the lack of legal structure in
cross-border defaults. Elizabeth K. Somers, The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act: An
InternationalProposalfiorDomestic Legislation, 6 AM. U. J.INT'L L. & PoLY 677, 677 nn.4-5 (1991) (citing
Mears, supra note 4, at 25).
20. Mears, supra note 4, at 25. In light of increasing the integration of national economies, "a global
economic disruption may trigger international insolvencies on a massive scale [resulting in] economic and legal
chaos for creditors, debtors, and such innocent third parties as consumers, investors and governments." l
21. See Powers, supra note 11, at 3 (identifying barriers which have prevented the successful negotiation
of bankruptcy treaties).
22. Mears, supra note 4, at 32.
23. Letter from Timothy E.Powers, Chairman, Committee J,Subcommittee on International Co-operation
in Bankruptcy Proceedings, to Tandi A. Panuska (Feb. 22, 1993) (on file with The TransnationalLawyer).
24. Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 303.
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States, while developing a plan for repayment of creditors.25 On the other hand,
international bankruptcy law is also implicated where the liquidator of an insolvent foreign
entity seeks turnover and central distribution of all of the foreign debtor's assets, even those
located within the United States, according to that country's insolvency law.2 6
Special issues arise where the international bankruptcy is a reorganization-type
bankruptcy in which the debtor continues to function as a going concern, such as one under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 27 These special issues, which are
beyond the scope of this Comment, generally arise because not all countries recognize the
validity of reorganization-type bankruptcy.28 Most countries do, however, have systems
for liquidating the assets of an insolvent debtor. 29 Therefore, this paper focuses on the
issues that arise in the context of a liquidation-type international bankruptcy, such as under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
A.

Different Perspectivesin InternationalInsolvencies

There are three ways that a practitioner might become involved in a multinational
insolvency.3" First, the practitioner may seek recovery of property which is located in a
foreign country. 3 In this situation practitioners are most concerned with national laws
governing the title to goods, and the rights of suppliers and other parties holding security
interests in the property in question.32 Second, the practitioner administering a domestic
bankruptcy may encounter overseas creditors, suppliers, debtors, customers, and potential
buyers of the business.3 3 Here, the greatest problems lie in convincing the interested
foreign parties, who are not familiar with the domestic law under which the bankruptcy is
being administered, of the practitioner's legal right to dispose of the business or assets and
ability to assure clear title.34 Finally, the most complex and common problems facing
international practitioners arise where companies with overseas subsidiaries become
insolvent; the overseas companies may be insolvent or independently profitable and

25. Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. United States Lines, 2 All ER 77 (1988). Jon R. Lind & Gregory F.
Nowak, Special Report on InternationalSecurities Lending: United States, 1991 GLOBAL INVETOR/IFL REv.
31 (1991) (outlining securities practitioner's perspective on the risk of loss to participants in multinational
securities lending transactions in the event of bankruptcy; typical contractual provisions utilized; and the
mechanics of proceeding against collateral under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
26. Interpool, LTD. v. Certain Freight of M/V Venture Stare, 102 B.R. 373 (D.NJ. 1988).
27. See generally 1 DALHUIsEN, supranote 1, §§ 2.01-2.07, at 2-134to2-221 (comparing rehabilitation
laws of various countries).
28.
l
29. See generally id §§ 1.01-1.08, at 2-7 to 2-13.8 (outlining the development of liquidation proceedings
in various countries).
30. A fourth scenario involving international bankruptcy issues exceeds the scope of this Comment. It
occurs where an insolvency practitioner accepts an appointment to a foreign company in an overseas country
with different laws, languages, and customs than that of the practitioner. This situation rarely arises because it
is usually not a practical solution. Furthermore, most countries do not accept foreign representatives in local
bankruptcies. William Gawen Mackey, Practical Problems of Cross Frontier Insolvency, in INsOL '85:
INTERNATIONAL INSOLvENCy CONFERENcE § 14.05 (Sheldon Lowe ed., 1985).

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id
Id
Id
Id
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successful."5 In any given cross-border insolvency practitioners may encounter any or all of
these three specific problems.3"
1.

A Hypothetical Illustratingthe Insolvency of a MultinationalBusiness

The following hypothetical illustrates a situation where practitioners would face all three
problems set forth above. Suppose that a parent corporation (P,.s) is an airline with its
principal place of business and its place of incorporation in the United States. Pus finances
its operations primarily through lending agreements with secured creditors located in the
United States (Cu.). Cu, issue relatively low cost loans in exchange for secured status in
the event of default. An airline hub in Great Britain (C,,)is an unsecured fuel supplier of
Pus. who charges higher than market interest rates to compensate for the risky debt incurred
when Pu.s. buys fuel on credit. Suppose that about a month ago, an accident involving a Pu.s.
airplane in Great Britain, injured a group of British citizens who are now tort claimants
(TCB). Due to low volumes of travelers and the impending tort claims, Pu.s. is forced into
insolvency and files for bankruptcy in the United States. 7
Assume further that Pu.s. owns 80% interest in a French subsidiary corporation (SF ),
which makes pre-packaged airline meals for Pu.s., and has existing obligations to secured
creditors located in France (CF,). Finally, suppose that on the date of the filing of the
central bankruptcy in the United States, Pu.s.'s most valuable assets,,numerous airplanes,
happen to have landed in Great Britain for refueling.
2.

Problemsfor Practitioners

IfcC . and TC.,,. sue P.,.in Great Britain before the airplanes depart, the administrator
of the central bankruptcy in the United States may seek turnover of the airplanes and
extraterritorial recognition of the automatic stay 3 enjoining all collection activities against
property of the P,.,.bankruptcy estate pending administration.39 The administrator must
determine the extent to which comity may be granted, if at all. When CG.B. seeks satisfaction
of its claims from the debtor's local assets, the courts in Great Britain should at least consider
deferring to the central insolvency proceeding in the United States in the interests of
universality. 40 If the two countries' insolvency schemes are roughly similar and Coa"would

35. Mackey, supra note 30, § 14.05. This problem involves difficult questions of managerial and
corporate liability which Ere beyond the scope of this Comment. For authority dealing with these issues in depth,
see 1 DAI.HIsEN, supra note 1, §§ 3.01-3.09, 3 passim.
36. See Mackey, i:upra note 30, § 14.05.
37. Assume that the bankruptcy administration in the United States is the "central bankruptcy proceeding"
for purposes of applying the universality doctrine.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 3,52 (1992).

39.

This hypothetical is not as far from reality as it might seem at rust glance, as reported in a recent

edition of The Economisn
All bankruptcies cause confusion. When a bankrupt company has assets and creditors strewn across
several countries, confusion can become chaos. Far-flung creditors lunge for the assets within their
reach. The company's main liquidators try to lure them home (aeroplanes in mid-flight have been
instructed to turn back). Creditors may spend years in court resolving disputes created by clashing
legal systems.
Sharing the Worl's CorporateCarrion, EcONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1992, at 61 (U.S. ed. at 67).
40. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing potential systemic benefits of worldwide
recognition of a central insolvency proceeding in accordance with principles of universality).
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not suffer procedural discrimination in the United States bankruptcy administration,
deference would be equitable to creditors as a whole because it avoids piecemeal dismantling
of the debtor's estate.4 However, in the special case of tort creditors such as TCG.1. ,
deference to the central United States bankruptcy proceeding is less likely to be extended by
British courts because the local victims did not voluntarily enter into a relationship with a
United States corporation.42
There are at least three general perspectives from which practitioners could approach
this cross-border insolvency problem. First, creditors from three different countries may
claim an interest in the airplanes, and as mentioned above, the practitioner administering the
central insolvency will be in the unfortunate position of seeking recovery of property located
in a foreign country. If this attempt is unsuccessful, then practitioners representing the
secured creditors Cu," and CF.. must litigate their claims at the location of the debtor's
assets in order to recover. Second, if SFfce isindependently profitable and successful, it may
be in the best interest of all parties for Sr, to continue to function independently of the
parent corporation. With the parent in liquidation, the administrator is obligated to maximize
the value of the parent's estate. To do so, the administrator must find a buyer willing to
accept her ability to deliver clear title to a foreign enterprise. Third, to determine which
claimants are entitled to the proceeds of this sale (assuming a sale is possible), practitioners
must determine the scope and extent of the parent-subsidiary relationship which entails an
inherent choice of law problem.
For the sake of clarity, the remainder of this Comment focuses primarily on the first of
these three problems, that is, recovering the international assets of an insolvent debtor for
equitable distribution among all creditors in a central insolvency proceeding.
B. TheoreticalBackground
When a business with assets or creditors in more than one country becomes insolvent,
conflicting international laws and clashing governmental priorities complicate the resolution
of the debtor's affairs.43 Even in countries such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain,
and Australia, whose bankruptcy laws stem from the same Elizabethan common law
tradition, very few similarities remain in the area of insolvency law."
The concepts of comity, territoriality, universality, and reciprocity form a backdrop for
understanding the existing international insolvency legislation and proposals for reform.
Comity provides the method for resolving jurisdictional conflict where there is no controlling
treaty.45 Comity is a common law principle that involves "the recognition which one nation

41. See infra notes 51-53, 74-79 and accompanying text (describing the inefficiencies and costs associated
"with territoriality).
42. Continental Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Versatile Pacific Shipping, Inc., No. C-91-2798, 1991
U.S. Dist. LExIs 13485 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
43. Joseph, supra note 2, at 720-21.
44. Sherry R. Sontag, Lawyers Navigate Through Chaos of Worldwide Failures, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 30,
1991, at 19 (interviewing Richard A. Gitlin of Hebb & Gitlin P.C., president of INSOL International, a group
of professionals devoted to cross-border insolvency education).
45. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Laker Court defined this term as follows:
'Comity' summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept-the degree of deference
that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the
forum. Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its
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allows within its tenitory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own

citizens."' Federal courts generally extend comity whenever the foreign court has proper
jurisdiction over a dispute and enforcement of the foreign judgment does not prejudice the
rights of United States citizens or violate domestic public policy. 47 In the context of
multinational bankruptcies, comity
entails the reconciliation of two conflict of law theories:
48
territoriality and universality.
These two theories make international insolvency cooperation difficult because the two
conflicting theories coexist in many nations' insolvency policies. 49 Currently, most
countries' bankruptcy provisions embody the universality theory with respect to the
jurisdiction of their own laws, while
providing limited, if any, recognition to the
50
extraterritorial effects of foreign laws.
The theory of territoriality, known as the grab rule, provides that each jurisdiction where
a debtor's assets are located at the time of insolvency may deny any extraterritorial effect of
a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. 5 Territoriality is a concept that is mutually exclusive
from both universality and reciprocity.52 The result of territoriality is often both inefficient
and inequitable because the multinational debtor's estate is separated according to the

recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain. However, the
central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be
given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international co-operation and encourages
reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.
The interests of both forums are advanced-the foreign court because its laws and policies have been
vindicated; the domestic country because international co-operation and ties have been strengthened.
Comity is a necessary outgrowth of our international system of politically independent, socioeconomically interdependent nation States. As surely as people, products and problems move freely
among adjoining counties, so national interests cross territorial borders. But no nation can expect its
laws to reach further than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Every nation must
often rely on other countries to help it achieve its regulatory expectations. Thus, comity compels
national courts to act at all times to increase the international legal ties that advance tie rule of law
within and among nations.
However, there are limitations to the application of comity. When the foreign act is inherently
inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize
the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity.
No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally
prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus from the earliest times, authorities have recognized
that the obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the
foreign act ....
731 F.2d at 937. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. v. Salen Reefer Servs. A.B., 773 F.2d 452, 457-58 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applying comity analysi, in international insolvency proceeding in the absence of controlling treaty). See also
Douglas G. Boshkoff, UnitedStatesJudicialAssistancein Cross-BorderInsolvencies, 36 INT'L. COMp. L.Q. 729,
730-35 (1987) (describing application of the comity analysis to recognize foreign insolvencies by non-bankruptcy
U.S. courts).
46. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164.
47. Id. at 202-03. See CunardSteamship, 773 F.2d at 457.
48. Eric W. Lam, Bankruptcy Code Section 304(b)(3): "Other Appropriate Relief" for Multinational
Bankruptcy, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 479, 481 (1990).
49. 1 DALHuISEN, supra note 1, § 2.03[3], at 3-190.
50. See Powers, supra note 11, at 5.
51. Icd; Lam, supranote 48, at 483; Anne Norby Nielsen, Comment, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code:
Has it Fosteredthe Development of an "InternationalBankruptcy System?" 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541,
557 (1984).
52. Lam, supra note 48, at 483.
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location of its assets, with each jurisdiction favoring local creditor's claims regardless of
other creditors or other jurisdictions.53

In contrast, the universality principle envisions global recognition of one central
bankruptcy proceeding.? In its purest form, this principle relies on lexfori to conduct the
entire insolvency proceeding, including cross-border ancillary proceedings, under the law

of the domicile of the debtor.55 For determining threshold jurisdictional issues, such as the
outer boundary of what constitutes the debtor's estate, local courts should generally lookto
the substantive law in which a central foreign insolvency proceeding is pending to determine
what constitutes the foreign debtor's estate.56 However, where the very nature of property
interests are in issue, it may be more appropriate to compromise the lexfori rule, to some
extent, to account for inherent local policy concerns. 7
Two underlying economic theories operate to support universality.58 The first is the
Rough Wash theory which suggests that when a central bankruptcy proceeding is recognized
universally, any losses suffered by local creditors in a particular case will be balanced by
benefits of foreign deference to the local forum in other cases. 59 Second, the Transactional
Gain theory anticipates the benefits of an increased flow of commerce at lower transaction
costs that would result from a predictable multinational insolvency system based on
universality.'
In order to realize the economic benefits of adopting universality, other nations must
reciprocate. 6 Reciprocity may be seen as a subset of universality or as a condition

53. Mears supra note 4, at 25 (citing e.g., In re McLean Indust., Inc., 68 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986)); Todd Vogel, There'sNo Word for Chapter 11 in Dutch, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30, 1987, at 62.
54. Lam, supra note 48, at 483 n.21 (citing In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. 165, 167-68 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1983)); 1 DALHUIsEN, supra note 1, §§ 3 passim, 3-186; Nielsen, supra note 51, at 543. See generally
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 464-71 (outlining conditions necessary to achieve the potential benefits of
universalism); Powers, supra note 11, at 1 (citing John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignmentsfor
Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888)). Mr. Powers cites the recognition of the benefits of universality
in 1888, when Lowell observed that:
It is obvious that, in the present state of commerce and communication, it would be better in nine
cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in a
single proceeding and generally at a single place, better for the creditors, who would share alike, and
better for the debtor because all his creditors would be equally bound by his discharge.
Id. But see Kurt H. Nadelman, CreditorEquality in Inter-State Bankruptcy: A Requisite of Uniformity in the
Regulation of Bankruptcy, 98 U. PA. L. Rv. 41, 54 (1949) (criticizes terms as unuseful because of their
different meanings in different countries).
55. Powers, supra note 11, at 4.
56. In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267,271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); 2 CoLLMR ON BANKRUPTcY 304.01, at 30403 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993).
57. In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341,344 (2d Cir. 1992) (analogizing choice of law
in determining what constitutes property under § 304(b)(2) to the dichotomy of domestic U.S. bankruptcy and
siate law).
58. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 464.
59. It at 464-65.
60. Id. at 466.
61. Id. 464-71; John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978,30 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 631 (1980). "It is axiomatic that the universality theory cannot function without universal
acceptance. It was suitable to the Roman and British Empires within which there was a political reality of "one
world." Within these empires the internationalism in both law and trade prevented conflict of laws." Id at 634
(citing A. En-arqzwmo, CONflICr oF LAws § 2 (1962)). "In the modem world, universality is, for the most part,
effective only when two or more countries agree to recognize the universality of bankruptcy ..
Iad.."
(suggesting that the vehicle for achieving this cooperation might be a bankruptcy treaty).
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precedent to its successful application.62 Reciprocity agreements enable deference to a
foreign country's proceedings in one instance to be justified by the potential for deference
from that foreign country in another instance. 63 Candidates for reciprocity agreements need
to have roughly similar insolvency laws, but neither the systems nor the outcome in any
given case need be identical. 64
C. Overview of the CurrentInternationalLegal Environment
The first step that practitioners must confront when faced with an international
insolvency is ascertaining the relevant law.65 This involves looking to the insolvency rules
of various legal systems, which often produces conflicting results."
Currently, most international insolvencies are governed in practice, if not also in theory,
by the grab rule, or territoriality.67 This approach favors creditors who are in a position to
use local procedures to seize assets or to initiate local insolvency proceedings in any
jurisdiction where the debtor's assets might be found.68 "Everybody fights for what they can
get, everyone is like a vulture," describes Professor Stefan A. Riesenfeld, University of
California, Boalt Hall, a specialist in international insolvencies. 69 "Different countries have
different priorities and everyone has an inherent priority as to what's on his own soil."7

62.

Westbrook, supra note 2, at 467-68. More specifically, the author suggests that "critical-mass

reciprocity" is necessary to realize the benefits of the Rough Wash and Transactional Gain arguments. Maat 467.
The author defines critical mass reciprocity as "an extent of multilateral cooperation sufficient to convince each
cooperating state that enough other states have joined in reciprocal relationships to ensure the obtaining of the
benefits expected to flow from a particular sort of cooperation." Id. With respect to the drafting of U.S.
Bankruptcy Code section 304, "there was vigorous debate as to whether to include a reciprocity requirement."
Kurt H. Nadelmann, The ,gankruptcy Reform Act and Conflict of Laws: Trial-and-Error,29 HARV. INT'L LJ.
27, 38-41 (1988). "Drafters were eventually satisfied that a "comity" requirement, including reciprocity as an
element for consideration, would provide courts with greater flexibility than a straight reciprocity requirement."
id.
63.

Westbrook, supra note 2, at 467.

64. It has been suggested that panels of experts could be established to determine which particular
insolvency systems are compatible enough to enter into reciprocity agreements. Id. at 469. Once this is done,
it will eliminate many of the difficulties that arise when trial courts are left to determine ad hoe whether
deference to foreign legal systems is appropriate. Id. (analogozing GATT rules which necessarily entail a
limitation on the types of countries eligible for membership).
65. Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 348-50.
66. "A multinational business that fails, or that tried to reorganize in response to impending bankruptcy,
must face a maze of often conflicting insolvency laws in the several countries where its assets and creditors are
located. Furthermore, it finds no international means to discipline or integrate domestic bankruptcy laws so that
of its assets and satisfy all creditors in one proceeding, in one place. .. ." Powers, supra note
it may marshal all
11, at 2. Transnational lawyers must manage "worldwide defaults through a political system of nation states."
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 457. International insolvency cases are part of a much larger problem of the
regulation of transnational enterprise by a political system consisting of nation states. Jay L. Westbrook,
Extraterritoriality,Conflicts of Laws, and the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 Tax. INT'L L.J. 71
(1990) (reviewing A.D. NEALU & M.L STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BusINESs AND NATIONAL JUUSDICTION
(1988)).
67.

See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Discriminationin Foreign Bankruptcy Laws Against Non-Domestic Claims,

47 AM. BANKR. L. J. 147 (1973). See generally Powers & Mears, supra note 10 (providing a practical guide
for protecting U.S. debtor's assets in seven countries: Brazil, Canada, England, France, Germany, Japan, and
Mexico).
68. Honsberger, supra note 61, at 659-75.
69. Sontag, supra note 44, at 24 (quoting Stefan A. Riesenfeld of Boalt Hall).
70. Id
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Generally, it is unrealistic for an insolvency practitioner to expect even a one in ten chance
of recovering assets against resident local creditors.71 Local procedures control, regardless
of foreign proceedings and claims, and cooperation with other legal systems is limited to
those rare occasions where local assets exceed the demands of local claimants.72
Supporters of the grab rule defend this approach on the basis of unavoidable territorial
limitations on enforcement measures, protection of local creditorsjurisdictional variations
of insolvency laws, and the simplicity and certainty of local proceedings. 73 However, a
consequence of this system is that creditors receive disproportionate benefits depending upon
the location of valuable assets at the time ofinsolvency, the creditor's ability to pursue assets
in foreign locations, and perhaps the creditor's access to inside information or
communications with the debtor.74 For instance, applying the grab rule to the hypothetical
outlined above,75 the fortuitous location of the assets in the United Kingdom at the time
central bankruptcy was filed would mean that the unsecured Cu . would be satisfied first, no
matter how tenuous their claim. This approach denies recovery to persons who are not in
a position to pursue claims in distant locations and in most cases defeats the goal of equitable
distribution among creditors as a whole.
Furthermore, territoriality, though simple in application, comes with certain large scale
economic costs. One systemic problem is the inability to predict the results of insolvency.76
This adds to the risk, and therefore to the cost, of every international transaction, particularly
international financing of small or medium sized companies.77 Another type of cost occurs
because the inherently inefficient process of dismantling estates destroys values that would
otherwise be available to satisfy claimants in the enterprise!' These problems exist despite
nearly worldwide agreement that international bankruptcies should be resolved in one central
forum.7 9
IlL. UNITED STATES LAW: RELIEF FOR FOREIGN DEBTORS WITH
ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

Recognizing ForeignInsolvencies

Recent litigation involving the effect of foreign bankruptcies has occurred primarily
within the U.S. federal court system, even where the foreign representative has not sought

71. Mackey, supra note 30, § 14.02, at 14-4.
72. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 460.
73. 1 DALHuISEN, supra note 1, § 2.03[3], at 3-188.
74. Mears, supra note 4, at 25; Westbrook, supra note 2, at 460 (citing Stephan A. riesenfeld, The Status
of Foreign Administratorsof Insolvent Estates: A Comparative View, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 288 (1976)).
75. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
76. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 460; Mears supra note 10, at 25.
77. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 460; Cf. Mears, supra note 10, at 25 (illustrating the potential for

international insolvencies on a massive scale which could elevate existing inefficiencies to economic and legal
chaos).

78.

Westbrook, supra note 2, at 460.

79. 1 DALHUISEN, supra note 1, § 2.03(3) at passim; REPORT OF THE INsOLvENcY LAW REVIEW
CoMMiTrEE, INSoLvENcY LAW AND PRAcriCE Cmnd. No. 8558, chs. 49-50 (1982) (emphasizing the need to
harmonize insolvency laws in a trading community).
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relief under Title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy Code)." ° One commentator
suggests that this is due to an assumption by practitioners that federal judges are less
parochial in outlook and more familiar with international insolvency issues." Therefore,
the foreign representative might expect to receive more sympathy in a federal forum.82
It is generally more praciical for a foreign representative to use federal bankruptcy
procedures if assets are widely dispersed throughout the United States.83 If the foreign
representative fails to pursue remedies under the Bankruptcy Code, they are forced to bring
separate proceedings in every state where the debtor's assets can be found to protect the
foreign estate.84 In contrast, proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code provide broader relief
than is available from a single court and are effective beyond the borders of individual
states.8 5 Furthermore, even where a foreign representative instigates proceedings in a nonbankruptcy federal court, such court may appropriately refer such a case to the bankruptcy
.unit" of the federal court system.8 6
In the United States, the law controlling liquidation and reorganization of debtors is
codified in the Bankruptcy Code and is primarily the subject of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. 7 The procedural structure for effectuating substantive federal bankruptcy law
is contained in the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Bankruptcy Rules)." Finally, Title 28
of the United
States Code provides federal jurisdictional rules applicable in bankruptcy
9
8

cases.

Generally, when a foreign debtor has assets in the United States the Bankruptcy Code
provides two methods for the foreign representative to protect the foreign debtor's estate
from attachment or appropriation by local creditors. If the foreign debtor meets certain

80. See e.g., Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir.1976) (compelling transfer of corporate
records); Daniels v. Powell, 604 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (requesting relief from an alleged conversion);
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (tiling action against foreign
representative), affid in part, vacated, and remanded in part, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985); Kenner Prods. Co.
v. Societe Foncier et Financiere Agache-Willot, 532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (removing to federal court
from state court action by foreign representative was brought); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services
A.B., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
81. Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 733 n.16.
82. Id
83. Id. at 735.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1990); CunardSteamship Co., 773 F.2d at 452. The Cunard Court acknowledged
that it would have been "eminently proper for the district court to have referred the Cunard case to a bankruptcy
"unit" of the court" more experienced with bankruptcy issues, but that non-referral was not necessarily grounds
for reversal. 773 F.2d at 4.55.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1990). Provisions such as this, which grant jurisdiction over all the assels of an
insolvent debtor, are found in the bankruptcy laws of many countries, including Belgium, Canada, England,
France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg. Powers, supra note 11, at 6 n.14. For a discussion of the applicable
statutes, see I DAIHUSEN,supra note 1, § 2.02[2], at 3-158 (1986). For jurisdictional changes to the current
U.S. Bankruptcy Code which would arise if MHCA were adopted, see Amendments to United States Bankruptcy
Law Required to Incorporate the Model InternationalInsolvency CooperationAct (MIICA) (Approved By the
IBA BmNNIAL CONFERENCE, Strausbourg, France) (Oct. 4, 1989). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1990) (listing
the assets included in an estate for purposes of a U.S. bankruptcy).
88. Federal Rules orBankruptcy Procedure 1001-9032 (1992). Also, practitioners should consult the court
clerk for the relevant local bankruptcy rules promulgated by the local bankruptcy court under Bankruptcy Rule
9029.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1334, 157 (1992).
90. Joseph, supra note 2, at 726-27.
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jurisdictional requirements, a full bankruptcy case may be commenced.91 The other method
is found in Bankruptcy Code section 304, which enables foreign representatives to petition
U.S. bankruptcy courts to assist in the administration of U.S. assets subject to a pending
foreign insolvency proceeding.'e Though there are various bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
federal provisions for foreign representatives to pursue in seeking extraterritorial
recognition, 93 the intricacies of such provisions are beyond the scope of this Comment
which is limited to situations where recognition is sought pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
section 304.
Bankruptcy Code section 304 is a relatively progressive provision which allows a
foreign representative to commence a mini-proceeding, ancillary to a pending foreign
insolvency, without commencing a full U.S. bankruptcy case.' Trial courts have discretion
in determining whether to grant relief through application of the six factor test set forth in
section 304(c).95 Some foreign practitioners have expressed concern that such a system is
too unpredictable; such discretion could result in disguised territoriality if it is used to favor
local creditors.96 However, though courts have varied in their interpretation of these
factors, a distinct trend towards increased recognition of foreign insolvencies, in conformity
with the principle of universality, has recently emerged.97

91. Id. at 727. See Boshkoffsupra note 45, at 735-38 (outlining requirements for foreign representatives
to commence full voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceedings under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1990); see infra notes 10 1-22 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (1990). See also, Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 730-35 (outlining
methods under U.S. non-bankruptcy law for recognizing foreign insolvencies).
94.
d See Lamsupranote 48, at 480. The following illustration sets forth the circumstances surrounding
a typical section 304 proceeding: "A multinational corporation with assets in the United States declares
bankruptcy in a foreign country. American and foreign creditors of the debtor, despite-and perhaps in reaction
to - the [foreign] bankruptcy filing, begin levy and execution endeavors against the debtor's assets in the United
States." Id. To facilitate an orderly liquidation of the debtor's United States assets without triggering a full
bankruptcy proceeding the foreign trustee may commence a section 304 ancillary proceeding which involves
only a "mini-administration," the parameters of which are defined in Bankruptcy Code section 304(b). Id. at 481
(citing In re Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. 337, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987)).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1)-(6) (1990). The six factors are provided to guide the court in determining what
relief, if any, to grant in an ancillary proceeding. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Seas. 324-25 (1977),
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 5963, 6281 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 595]; S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5787, 5821
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 999]. Congress emphasized that "[p]rinciples of international comity and respect for the
judgments and laws of other nations suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders under
all of the circumstancesof each case, ratherthan being provided with inflexible rules." Id. at 6281; H. R. REP.
No. 595, at 325 (emphasis added).
96. MICA, supra note 6, § 1(b) cmt.
Certain additional factors which would arguably provide the Court with greater discretion to
deny aid to the foreign proceeding, such as those found in United States Bankruptcy Code § 304 and
Canadian Bill § 316(5), have not been included in the model act. Such omission is in response to
commentaries received from a number ofjurisdictions which criticize the United States provision for
giving too much discretion to the Court by enumerating multiple factors which the Court may
consider, and thus allowing many alternatives for determining to deny aid to foreign proceedings.
Id.
97. KennerProds.,532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting foreign representative's motion to transfer
case to U.S. court's suspense docket pending termination of bankruptcy proceedings in France); In re Culmer,
25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (allowing foreign representative to transfer assets to a district within the
Bahamas for foreign adjudication of the relative interests of American creditors); In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 675
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A., 10 B.R. 790 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (granting turnover of U.S. assets
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However, achieving universality is only half of the picture. Without reciprocity,
universality may be: seen as unilateral deference to foreign insolvency proceedings at the
expense of local creditors.98 Contrary to the apparent hopes of its drafters, 99 section 304
has not inspired other countries to adopt similar provisions."°° This Comment calls for
cautious recognition of the economic need for reciprocity with particular emphasis on the
pivotal roles of courts and practitioners in achieving reciprocal universality.
B. Commencing an Ancillary Proceedingunder Section 304
Prior to 1978, United States bankruptcy law contained no provision for the
administration of a foreign debtor's assets located in the United States. 1 ' Where foreign
representatives sought recognition of a pending foreign insolvency proceeding and protection
of the U.S. assets of the foreign debtor, their remedies were largely dictated by state and
federal enforcement ofjudgments law."°2 Under the modem Bankruptcy Code, the foreign

to representative of Nicaraguan bankruptcy proceeding subject to condition that claims of U.S. creditors be
satisfied first); Drexel EBurnam Lambert Group, Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(recognizing Dubai banlauptcy proceeding which, though different from U.S. law, was not inconsistent with
policies of American bankruptcy law). But see Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R.
373 (D.NJ. 1988) (denying a foreign representative's petition for ancillary relief under section 304 because it
considered the recognition of Australian bankruptcy proceedings to violate U.S. public policy); In re Toga Mfg.,
28 B.R. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (denying relief to representative of a Canadian bankrupt since Canadian
Bankruptcy Act sets forth different priorities among creditors than U.S. law).
98. Hearings on M.R. 31 and H.R 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
House Comm. on the Judciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1442 (1976) [hereinafter House Hearings].Kurt Nadchnan
presented opposition to the proposed section 304 on March 6, 1975 with a memorandum entitled "The
Bankruptcy Bill's Conflicts Provision: A Threat to the National Interest." Id at 1442-1509, 1533-35. Professor
Nadelmann referred to tie bill as a "giveaway program" because no counterpart was demanded from foreign
states. Id at 1444. Nad.lmann, supra note 62, at 39-41. In a section titled "A Proposal for Reciprocity,"
Professor Nadelmann suggests that:
for the United States to continue to disregard what occurs elsewhere is surely no way to progress.
The present attitude encourages bad situations. After closely observing the field for 30 years, I have
concluded that this passive attitude should be terminated. The interest of the American creditor can
be served more effectively. At the very least, other available avenues should be explored.
Ic. at 34. But see Honsberger, supra note 61, at 671-74 (offering responses to potential concern that section 304
could be viewed as a "give away" in that similar standing is not required granted to U.S. trustees by other
countries). First, "[c]ongress may have felt that the initiative of the United States concerning cases ancillary to
foreign proceedings might lead to similar measures in other countries." Id. at 671. Second, Honsberger suggests
that since only those foreign representatives who have been duly selected by a forum in which the debtor has
substantial connections may qualify for 304 relief. Id at 672. Therefore, section 304 just gives foreign trustees
standing to pursue four types of discretionary relief that were generally available in state court even before the
enactment of section 304. Id Finally, the author suggests that there is already a form of reciprocity built into
the code with respect to the standing of foreign trustees: "If the legislation of a foreign country discriminates
against foreign creditors, it is unlikely that a court in the United States would exercise its discretion in favor of
the petition of a trustee from such a country seeking to recover local property." Id
99.
Honsberger, supra note 61, at 671. Cf Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 349 (suggesting that the
implementation of section 304 by U.S. bankruptcy courts should have encouraged the major trading partners of
the U.S. to provide for similar ancillary relief under their bankruptcy laws).
100. Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 349.
101. Joseph, supra note 2, at 727-28.
102. See Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 730-38 (describing use of non-bankruptcy and full bankruptcy
procedures for enforcing foreign insolvency decrees). Both state and federal courts may be utilized by foreign
representatives seeking to transfer assets to the location of the pending foreign insolvency proceeding. See e.g.,
Disconto Geselischaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908); Clarkson Vo. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 554 F.2d 624 (2d Cir.
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debtor may choose to pursue a remedy under section 304 by voluntarily filing a case
aneillary to a foreign proceeding. 0 3 This section was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, to create a vehicle for foreign representatives to protect the foreign
bankruptcy estate's U.S. assets from piecemeal dismemberment." 4 Section 304
proceedings are procedural devices available to foreign representatives to permit cooperation
with foreign jurisdictions." 5 In enacting section 304, the United States illustrated an
increased willingness to recognize foreign insolvencies in accordance with principles of
universality."'s In order to administer assets in the United States and to prevent local
creditors from dismembering those assets, the representative of a foreign debtor may
commence a section 304 proceeding instead of a full bankruptcy case. " 7 This remedy is
intended to be broad and flexible.0 8
To obtain ancillary relief, a foreign representative must file a petition pursuant to section
304(a) in the federal district where the principal United States assets of the foreign debtor
arg located.' °9 However, instead of commencing a full proceeding, a foreign representative

1976); In re Delehanty's Estate, 11 Ariz. 366, 95 P. 109 (1908); Fincham v. Income from Certain Trust Funds
of Cobham, 81 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1948). In addition, foreign representatives may appear in proceedings commenced
by others and seek the same relief. See, e.g., CunardSteamship, 773 F.2d at 452; In re Stoddard, 151 N.E. 159
(NY Ct. Appeals 1926); In re Waite, 99 N.Y. 433, 2 N.E. 440 (NY Ct. Appeals 1885).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1990); Powers, supra note 11, at 10. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
104. Powers, supra note 11, at 9-10; CunardSteamship, 773 F.2d at 454. This endorsement of universality
by the United States has not been historically consistent. U.S. Courts traditionally rejected the doctrine of
universality with respect to insolvency proceedings and rarely recognized claims by foreign trustees on the U.S.
assets of foreign debtors. Id, See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827); Harrison v. Sterry,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
Following this initial line of cases, the courts reevaluated the universality doctrine and began recognizing
foreign bankruptcy proceedings based on the principle of comity among nations. See, e.g., Canada Southern Ry.
v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883); Banque de Financement, S.A. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911
(2d Cir. 1977); Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
978 (1976); Kenner Prod., 532 F. Supp. at 478. Though the foregoing cases are inconsistent and unclear, they
are based on the principle of comity of nations. Powers, supra note 11, at 3 n.4.
The most infamous international bankruptcy case, Bankhaus D. HerstattKommantdigesellschaftaufAktien
(Herstan),was not resolved in a U.S. court. Id. Though an involuntary petition was filed against Herstatt in New
York, the case was eventually settled when creditors from various countries agreed to an out-of-court liquidation
plan. Id This settlement on a grand scale was thought to be the only possible vehicle for resolving the dispute
because of the distinct lack of legal precedent in any country. Id. For a more detailed description and analysis
of this and other international insolvency issues see Kurt H. Nadelmann, Israel-BritishBank (London) Ltd: Yet
Another TransatlanticCrossing,52 AM. BANKR. Li. 369 (1978); Joseph, supra note 2, at 728-31 (summarizing
the three major cases that influenced Congress' decision to enact Bankruptcy Code section 304, including: (1)
the Herstatt matter, (2) the Israel-BritishBank v. FederalInsurance Corporationcase (the IBB case), and (3)
the Banque de Financement v. FirstNationalBank of Boston case (the Finabank case)).
105. Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 740 (emphasizes that a 304 proceeding is not a substantive device for
resolving cross-border insolvencies). But see Barbara K. Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign
Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L. L. 1153, 1178-83 (1985) (implying that section 304 is a substantive law provision).
106. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 471-73.
107. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 95; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 95.
108. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 95, at 5821; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 95, at 6261; Cunard
Steamship, 773 F.2d at 455. See, Angulo v. Kedzep, Ltd., 29 B.R. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (allowing flexible
section 304 ancillary proceedings for the limited purpose of obtaining discovery); House Hearings, supra note
98, at 1509-10 (1976) (Prof. Stefan A. Riesenfeld's Statement).
109. Though not expressly required by statute, it has been held that under section 304, a foreign debtor
must have assets located in the United States to seek ancillary relief. Continental Maritime of San Francisco,
Inc., v. Versatile Pacific Shipyards, Inc., No. C-91-2798, 1992 U.S. Dist. LExiS 13485 at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
31, 1992).
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may make a limited appearance, as authorized by section 306, to pursue relief under section
304, and thereby avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction within the United States for any
other purpose."'
Section 304 does not provide an automatic stay of debt collection activities."'
However, if dissipation or dismemberment of local assets is threatened, the foreign
representative may request a temporary restraining order be granted under section 304, or
section 105,11 to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the litigation. For
example, following the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI),
BCCI's foreign representatives requested and were granted a temporary restraining order
simultaneously with the commencement of a case under section 304.113 This temporarily
prohibited United States creditors from enforcing rights against (or dismantling) BCCI's
4
United States assets."
The petition mutt specify the form of relief requested by the foreign trustee as outlined
in section 304(b)." 5 Under section 304(b)(1) the representative may seek an injunction
prohibiting the commencement or continuation of any action in the United States against
property of a foreign debtor or enjoin the enforcement of a judgment against the foreign
debtor." 6 Additionally, the bankruptcy court may order that property be turned over for
central administration by the foreign insolvency court and stay the enforcement of any lien
or judgment obtained against such property pursuant to section 304(b)(2).' Finally, the
bankruptcy court has the residual discretion under section 304(b)(3) to order other relief
deemed appropriate."'
Under section 305,119 the bankruptcy court may abstain from taking or retaining
jurisdiction over a case involving a debtor who is the subject of a pending foreign proceeding
if, at any time, the court determines that certain factors set forth in Bankruptcy Code section
304(c) 2 ' warrant dismissal or suspension of the case.' If the bankruptcy court abstains
from hearing or dismisses an ancillary proceeding, local creditors are free to look to state
laws to advance their claims on the foreign debtor's local assets.'
C. Section 304(c): Criteriafor Granting Ancillary Relief

110. 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1992).
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1992) (providing an automatic stay for only petitions filed under § 301
(voluntary cases), § 302 (joint cases filed by husband and wife), § 303 (involuntary cases)); See also Boshkoff,
supra note 45, at 743 (suggesting that foreign representatives seeking protection of the automatic stay may

choose to file an involuntary petition under § 303(b)(4)).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1992).
113. Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, InternationalInsolvency andSection 304, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
19, 1991, at 3.
114. l
115. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1992).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 3(4(b)(1) (1992).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(2) (1992).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3) (1992). See generally Lam, supra note 48 (describing other appropriate relief
bankruptcy courts may giant).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1992).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1992). See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(2) (1992).
122. See Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 747-49.
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Section 304(c) sets forth the following six factors to be used as guidelines for
determining whether to grant a foreign debtor's petition for ancillary relief:' 23
1.
2.
3.
4.

[J]ust treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the

order prescribed by this title;
5.
6.

comity; and,
if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns."s

Section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is intended to balance universality

and territoriality concerns with respect to foreign bankruptcy proceedings." Nonetheless,
if these six factors are weighed evenly, and are interpreted as requirements instead of loose
guidelines, this provision could favor local creditors.'26 This is due to the fact that the
comity factor, which provides the only realistic basis for turnover of U.S. property of the
debtor to the foreign representative, is only one of six factors. 27 The fourth factor could
be utilized by territorialistic courts to deny recovery to the foreign representatives of any
country whose insolvency scheme deviates from that of the United States. 2 ' Factor two
likewise could be used to favor local creditors and defeat the principles of universality.'29
To the extent these provisions may be interpreted to encourage territoriality by favoring local
creditors it contradicts Congress' purported endorsement of the principle of universality. 3 '

123.

11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1992); H.R. REP. No. 95, supra note 95, at 324-25.

124.

11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1990).

125. 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1990); Booth, supra note 18, at 168. This provision permits a foreign representative
to appear in a United States court to seek relief under Bankruptcy Code sections 303, 304, or 305 without being
subjected to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States. The purpose is to prevent local creditors from
obtaining an unfair advantage over the foreign representative. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 95; S. REP. No.
989, supra note 95; Unger, supra note 105, at 1183.
126. Joseph, supra note 2, at 738-39; Nielsen, supra note 51, at 572. "It was also hoped that the inclusion
of a provision like section 304 in the Code would provide an incentive for other countries to adopt similar
provisions which would ultimately lead to greater uniformity in the handling of international insolvencies." Id.
at 572.
127. Nielsen, supra note 51, at 572.

128.
129.

See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 167-68 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)
I

130. See Joseph, supra note 2, at 728; Westbrook, supra note 2, at 471-73 (describing possible
territorialistic applications of section 304(c) factors as a potentially fatal flaw in the statutory scheme). "Section
304 of the Bankruptcy Code represents a dramatic step beyond what any other national insolvency law has done,
primarily because of its procedural provisions and because it has a legislative history that endorses universalism.
It was the first explicit command by a legislature to its courts to cooperate in transnational insolvency matters,
with procedures provided to assist in the execution of that command." I at 471. These sections were only

meant to apply where the foreign system lacks meaningful avoiding powers generally, or where it has
distribution rules that are "so different from U.S. principles as to be intolerable (for example, absence of national
treatment for foreign creditors or distribution first come, first-served."). Id See supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
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However, despite the potential for abuse, courts have demonstrated a trend towards
universality by treating the six factors as mere guidelines in accordance with the legislative
history of section 304(c):"
The court is to be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of the estate, consistent with just treatment of all creditors and equity
security holders; protection of local creditors and equity security holders against
prejudice and inconvenience in processing claims and interests in the foreign
proceeding; prevention of preferential or fraudulent disposition of property of the
estate; distribultion of the proceeds of the estate substantially in conformity with the
distribution provisions of the bankruptcy code; and, if the debtor is an individual,
the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start. These guidelinesare designed to
give the court the maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases. Principlesof
internationalcomity and respectfor the judgments and laws of other nations
suggest thatthe courtbepermittedto make the appropriateordersunderall ofthe
12
circumstancesof the case, ratherthan beingprovided with inflexible rules.
Furthermore, though neither section 304(c) nor its legislative history specifies the weight
to be given to the six factors, most courts view cornity as the most significant factor since
the other factors (besides the fresh start element) are inherently taken into account when
considering comity.'
Though bankruptcy courts have taken different approaches in applying the section
304(c) factors, the modem trend seems to be for courts to give greater recognition to foreign
representatives, forwarding the policy of universality."
D. EncouragingReciprocal Universality under Section 304(c)
Though the ancillary proceeding under section 304 is generally considered to be
progressive and in accord with universality principles,13 the statute's lack of an explicit
reciprocity provision is not met with universal approval. 36 The lack of such a provision
has been attributedto the inadequate representation from experts in the field of international
conflicts of law and lack of input from the executive branch on the issue of reciprocity
during the drafting of section 304.137 Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann expressed

131. See, e.g., infia note 134 and accompanying text.
132. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 95, at 324-25 (emphasis added).
133. In re Koreag, 130 B.R. at 712. But see In re Paveleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584, 594 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988) (expressly refusing to follow cases granting comity greater weight than the other five factors).
134. See Powers, supra note 11, at 17. U.S. bankruptcy courts are still not entirely comfortable applying
section 304 and balancing domestic policy with the protection of U.S. creditors with the application of principles
of comity and universality. Id However, despite initial inconsistencies, case law evinces a trend towards a more
pure application of section 304 and greater recognition of foreign representatives by U.S. bankruptcy courts. Id
(citing In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Metzeler, 78 Bankr. 674 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.
1987); In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
135. See supra notes 125, 130 and accompanying text.
136. See Nadelmann, supra note 62 at 31-33.
137. Nadelmann, supra note 62, at 31-33. "Unfortunately, problems of conflict of laws were given only
cursory treatment.., the: Commission [on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States] members apparently were
appointed without conflict of laws in mind. No specialist on private intemational law was on the Commission
staff." Id at 31. "The House Subcommittee lacked expert staff on international conflicts, and none was added.
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dissatisfaction with the fact that, in the drafting of section 304,13legislation in the conflicts
field was handled "as merely ancillary to some other subject."'
The section 304(c) analysis balances local and foreign concerns. 139 Though not
explicitly set forth in section 304, there is some support for the proposition that reciprocity
is an element of the comity analysis.14 The following example illustrates the balancing
of all six section 304(c) factors and the promotion of reciprocal universality.
Where a foreign representative seeks turnover of the U.S. assets of a foreign debtor, this
Comment suggests that courts analyze the section 304(c) factors individually, realizing that
a single factor may support local, foreign, or both interests, depending on the circumstances.
However, despite the fact that the weight and force of each factor will vary from case to case,
where turnover of U.S. property is sought, the court will inevitably employ the six delineated
factors to balance two141broad policies: "local creditor concerns" versus the "benefits of
foreign recognition."
Local creditors interests tend to be addressed under section 304(c)(2), (3), or (4).142
These factors generally ensure that local U.S. creditor's due process rights would not be
sacrificed if turnover were granted. Such interests are analyzed by looking to the
fundamental fairness ofrequiring a local U.S. creditor to pursue their claim within a foreign
insolvency proceeding. Instead of being purely parochial in nature, these inquiries ensure
that rough justice will be afforded the U.S. creditor under the laws of the foreign proceeding.
Under section 304(c) courts must decide whether the foreign legal system is similar enough
to that of the U.S. to avoid prejudice to the local U.S. creditors. For example, where a
foreign legal system expressly penalizes foreign creditors and denies non-residents an
opportunity to be heard, it would be fundamentally
unfair to require U.S. creditors to litigate
143
their claims within the foreign proceeding.

On the Senate side, one Judiciary Committee member also sat on the Foreign Relations Committee, but no effort
was made to take advantage of the latter Committee's staff." Id. "Another procedural misfortune was that the
executive branch was never heard on the issue of reciprocity of recognition of bankruptcy adjudications.
Apparently, the State Department thought an invitation from Congress was needed; only in exceptional cases
will the Administration ask to be heard. Efforts on [Professor Nadelmann's] part at the House hearings to have
such an invitation sent were without success . . . no outsider, individual or spokesman for a national
organization, was heard on the reciprocity issue." Id. at 32. But see Nielsen, supra note 51, at 556; Donald T.
Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 HARv. INT'L.. 49, 52 (1988)
(suggesting that though reciprocity has been mentioned in the comity analysis and section 304 applies without
regard to the existence of similar provisions in the foreign law).
138. Nadelmann, supra note 62, at 33.
139. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
141. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 473 (asserting that section 304 has produced a "mixed bag of judicial
results" since it "simply proclaims universalism and local preference in the same breath and leaves it to the
courts to fashion something worthwhile from its conflicting motives.") Id. In enacting section 304, Congress was
attracted by the ideals of universality, but was troubled by outcome differences which would sacrifice local
creditors' interests-'[s]o they embraced both and neither." Id.
142. 11 U.S.C. §§ 304(c)(2), (3), (4) (1990); see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
143. See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 468-69 (describing the importance of the similarity in legal systems
in a system of reciprocal universality). As an analogy, countries chosen to participate in GATT were required
to have roughly similar legal systems. Id "[Niot all nations are in a position to adopt all of the GATT rules and
countries are not invited to be full members unless they have reached that point. One must fully respect the
position of a country that feels unable to adopt an insolvency system roughly similar to that of others, because
such a system may be inappropriate for that society. But that country may have to pay the price of foregoing
participation in the benefits of international cooperation in matters of default." Ia.
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Where turnover would not violate basic due process rights of local U.S. creditors, the
court should consider the benefits of foreign recognition. Foreign creditors' interests tend
to be addressed under section 304(c)(5), (1), and (6). Turnover to the foreign insolvency
proceeding is generally favored under the principle of comity embodied in section
304(c)(5).'" The concerns of a particular local creditor should be irrelevant under section
304(c)(5) since thae interests were previously considered. The local creditors' interest that
is relevant in the section 304(c)(5) comity analysis should be protecting the long term
economic interests of local U.S. creditors in the aggregate. This is achieved by encouraging
reciprocity, not by favoring local creditors. Reciprocity, in turn, ensures the economic
benefits of univermlity envisioned by the Rough Wash and Transactional Gain theories. 4 '
Courts must not employ a strict or positive reciprocity requirement to protect local
creditors since such an approach does not facilitate international insolvency cooperation.'4 6
Instead, a negative reciprocity provision, or a reciprocity factor, should be employed at this
stage so that the economic benefits of universality may be realized by the United States. 47
For example, the foreign representative should be entitled to a presumption of reciprocity.
This presumption may be overcome by local creditors if they produce evidence of nonreciprocity by the foreign state. Once the presumption is overcome, the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of reciprocity should fall on the foreign representative.
IV. THE RECIPROCITY ISSUE: DIPLOMAnCALLY ENFORCING
A PRO-RECIPROCITY POLICY

Unless otherwise bound by treaties, no courts are obligated to recognize and respect the
judgments of courts of other nations. 48 Nevertheless, many American courts recognize
foreign judgments, in accordance with universality principles, unless there are clear reasons
not to do so, such as where the recognition of a particular foreign judgment would be
contrary to public policy. 49 Reciprocity is a controversial component of the comity
analysis which does not engender unanimous support. 5 '
Instead offraming a strict reciprocity requirement, comity cases suggest that reciprocity
is more appropriately considered as a factor in recognizing foreign judgments. One
commentator distinguishes between two types of reciprocity.'5 ' The first type requires that
another jurisdiction affirmatively cooperate before this jurisdiction will do so. 152 This
approach tends to stifle cooperation because of the inherent impasse it creates. 5 3 The
second type, the approach advocated by this Comment, is "negative reciprocity."'5 4 A
negative reciprocity provision permits cooperating with a foreign jurisdiction until clear

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
See infra note 148 and accompanying text (defining positive reciprocity requirement).
See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (defining negative reciprocity provision).
Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de Aviacion, C. Por A., 556 F.2d 611 (1stCir. 1977).
Id.
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 467-68.
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 468.
Id.
Id.

IM.
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evidence indicates that the other jurisdiction has a policy of non-cooperation. 155 This
approach is more likely to engender cooperation than retaliation.1 6
With respect to international insolvency cooperation, the commitment to principles of
universality cannot be made in a vacuum. As mentioned previously, reciprocity may be seen
as a condition precedent to realizing the economic benefits of universality. 57 If other
countries do not reciprocate, universality may result in unilateral deference to foreign
insolvency proceedings, at local creditors' expense, without an offsetting gain. 58
A.

Considering Reciprocity within a Comity Analysis

Generally, the concept of reciprocity is a practical consideration in federal courts'
decisions to grant comity to a foreign adjudication.159 Proponents of strict reciprocity
requirements (for example, disgruntled local creditors whose attachment attempts have been
hampered by recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding) argue that American courts
should not recognize foreign insolvency proceedings unless their citizens have the benefit
of similar recognition by foreign courts. 6" The problem with adopting a strict reciprocity
requirement is that such an approach encourages retaliation by the foreign country, instead
of cooperation. Ironically, this can cause a reaction-based backslide into territoriality.' 6'
For this reason, this Comment recommends a flexible reciprocity provision rather than a
strict reciprocity requirement.
In Hilton v. Guyot, 62 the common law principle of comity of nations was articulated.
In that case, the United States Supreme Court held, in a five to four decision, that a French
judgment was not conclusive on the merits. Instead, the Court recognized reciprocity as a
factor in the comity analysis by treating the French judgment as only prima facie evidence
of what the plaintiff sought to prove, since that63was the treatment France would have
accorded a similarly situated American plaintiff.
In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence
of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon
one person by reason of injustice done to another: but upon the broad ground that
international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the
principles of international law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the
comity of our own country, which it is our judicial duty to know and to declare, the
judgment is not entitled to be considered conclusive."'

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
158. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 468.
159. Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 734.
160. Westbrook, supra note 2, at 468 (describing impasse created by "positive" or strict reciprocity
requirements).
161. See i (tracing the "evils" associated with reciprocity to positive or strict reciprocity requirements
as opposed to negative reciprocity provisions).
162. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
163. Id. at 117.
164. Id at 227-28.
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Since Hilton v. Guyot was decided before Erie R Co. v. Tompkinse and Klaxon v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co.' its applicability is limited in situations where federal courts are sitting
in diversity jurisdiction.16 7 However, under section 304(5) the Hilton comity analysis,
which includes the consideration of reciprocity, 68 has generally been applied. 6 9

165. 304 U.S. 6t, 82 LEd. 1188, 58 S.Ct. 817, 11 A.IR. 1487 (1938). In this case, the United States
Supreme Court established the general principle that with respect to matters which are not governed by the
Constitution or by acts of Congress, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are required to apply state law
rather than federal law in determining issues of substantive law. L1d
166. 313 U.S. 4:37, 85 L.Ed. 1477, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1941). Subsequent to the Eric decision, the United
States Supreme Court clarified that a federal court sitting in diversity is required to follow conflict of laws rules
of the state in which the court is located. Id.
167. In cases arising subsequent to Erie and Klaxon, it has been held that in diversity of citizenship cases,
state law rather than federal law controls the determination of whether a valid foreign judgement is entitled to
extraterritorial effect in federal district court. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 631 F. Supp. 314,
affid. 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. Ill.) (holding that the enforceability of judgments rendered by courts of foreign
nations is to be determined under the law of the state in which enforcement is sought); Toronto-Dominion Bank
v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (where a federal court's jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, the enforceability of a judgment obtained in Canada would be governed by state law); Hunt v. BP
Exploration Co. (Libya) Utd. 580 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Somportex Utd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 13 A.LR. Fed. 194, cert denied 405 U.S. 1017, 31 L.Ed.2d 479, 92 S.Ct. 1294 (3d Cir.
1971) (relying on Erie, the court concluded that where jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citizenship,
the question of whether an English judgment was entitled to recognition by a federal district court was governed
by the law of the state where the federal court was located); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp.
448 (D.C. Mass. 1966) (relying on Erie, the court held that Massachusetts law rather than federal law was
applicable in determining whether to give conclusive effect to a the judgment of a Swedish Court); Compania
Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907 (1941), aff'd 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942) (citing
Erie and Klaxon, indicating state law controlled the determination of whether a Mexican judgment was against
public policy).
However, it has been recognized that despite the Erie doctrine, "much can be said for the suggestion that
the measure of respect to which judgments of foreign nations are entitled should be regulated by uniform
national law rather than be left to the diverse views of the individual states. Furthermore, since the effect of such
judgments in this country clearly affects our relations with other nations, the question would seem properly to
fall within the federal sphere." Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in This Country of JudgmentsRendered Abroad,
50 CoLUM. L. REV.783, 788 (1950).
168. See, e.g., Venezuelan Meat Export Co. v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. Md. 1935) (citing
Hilton, holding that a French judgment was not resjudicatain U.S. courts due to lack of reciprocity); Harrison
v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d 667 (Ist Cir. 1929) (relying on Hilton, holding that the judgments of foreign
countries are to be recognized by U.S. courts to the same extent that courts in the foreign country would extend
recognition to hypothetical U.S. petitioners); Burnham v. Webster, 4 F. Cas. 781 (CCMe 1846) (No. 2179)
(recognizing that consideration should be given to the reciprocal recognition of U.S. judgments, and that comity
should not be granted to the judgments of the courts of other countries which pay no respect to the judgments
of courts of the U.S.); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (D.C. Pa. 1970) (recognizing
that cases involving the Securities Exchange Act address different issues from those litigated in Zambia, the
court expressed the view that since Zambian courts would deny recognition to the findings of U.S. courts, the
ruling of a Zambian court was not binding on federal district court). But see Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya),
492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Somportex, 318 F. Supp. 161, aff'd 453 F.2d 435, cert. denied 405 U.S.
1017; RESTATEmENT 2d, Conflict of Laws, § 98 (e), cmt. e. In the context of cases that did not involve
international insolvencies, it has been suggested that the likelihood that the Supreme Court in Hilton intended
reciprocity to be a condition precedent to the recognition of comity "has received no more than desultory
acknowledgement." Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440, n.8, citing Discontento-Gesslschaft v. United States Steel Corp.,
300 F. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (dictum);
New York, Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transnatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1926).
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As previously mentioned, reciprocity is a controversial aspect of a comity analysis
which does not engender universal support. 7 ' Judge Learned Hand appropriately rejected
a positive reciprocity requirement in explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton
"certainly did not mean to hold that an American court was to recognize no obligations or
duties arising elsewhere until it appeared that the sovereign of that locus reciprocally
recognized similar obligations existing here." 7
In1985, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in CunardSteamshipCo., v. SalenReefer
Services, 72 held that reciprocity was not an essential element of comity, but that it was
appropriate to consider in determining what relief should be extended in international
insolvency cases.17 Cunard argued that since there was no indication that Swedish courts
would grant comity to a United States bankruptcy court under analogous circumstances, the
district court's granting of comity here was improper.1 74 The Cunardcourt was not
persuaded by plaintiff's reciprocity argument:
We find this contention is without merit. In nations which share our ideals of
justice and concepts of procedural due process, it may almost be assumed that a
final judgment of one of our courts of competent jurisdiction would be accorded
deference. Nevertheless, while reciprocity may be afactorto be considered, it is
not required as a condition precedent to the granting of comity ....175
In 1978, the two leading experts in the field of international insolvency, Professor
Stephan A. Riesenfeld of Boalt Hall and Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann, debated intensely
whether or not to include a federal bankruptcy requirement of reciprocity in section 304.176
Eventually, Congress was probably satisfied that other countries would spontaneously enact

169. Some commentators propose that federal notions of comity apply under section 304. Booth, supra
note 18 at 168, n.194; Boshkoff, supra note 45, at 733; Douglass G. Boshkoff, American Reports - The
American Judicial System and Cross-Border Insolvencies, ch. 4(a) in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY:
COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS 63 (Ian F. Fletcher ed. 1990). Cf.L.F.E. Goldie, The Challenge of Transnational
Expectations and the Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Decrees - The United States Adjustment, 58 BRrr.
Y.B. Ibr'L 303, 330-31 (1987) (noting that either the "interpretation of comity in Hilton v. Guyot, the individual
states interpretations, or some combination of the two, is to be applied [ina section 304 analysis]. On the other
hand, the provision could also be read as an invitation to the bankruptcy courts to mold a uniform federal
common or decisional law." Id. at 330-31. But see Nadelman, supra note 62, at 43-44. Professor Nadelmann
opposes the blanket federalization of state conflicts of law on foreign bankruptcy adjudications as potentially
unconstitutional in certain situations. Id. Eg., where a foreign debtor has funds in a U.S. bank account, but no
U.S. claims exist, neither the Bankruptcy Clause (U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.4), the Commerce Clause nor
Foreign Relations Power "exist to promote circumvention of the Tenth Amendment." Il at 44.
170. See Boshkoffsupra note 45, at 734; Huber, supra note 13, at 760; Nadelmann, supra note 8, at 3435; Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 346-50; Stevens, supra note 18, at 72-76.
171. Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F.2d 741,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924),
a.ffd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925), quoted in In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. 964, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)
(comity granted to judgment of Swedish bankruptcy tribunal).
172. 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
173. 773 F.2d 452 (1985). Cunard plaintiff-appellant appealed an order of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York which vacated an attachment Cunard had obtained against an insolvent Swedish
defendant. kL
174. Id,
175. Cunard,773 F.2d at 457 (citing e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381,
387, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926)).
176. House Hearings,supra note 98, at 1441.
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reciprocal legislation in response to cooperation from the United States courts via section
304277 However, section 304 is increasingly utilized by representatives of foreign
insolvency proceedings,""8 no other countries have adopted similar provisions for
recognizing the extraterritorial effect of U.S. bankruptcies." 9
V. ]PROPOSAL FOR DOMESTIC LEGAL REFORM: THE MODEL
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY COOPERATION Acr

A general consensus among practitioners favors reforming the present system of
international insolvency. 8 Most commentators also agree that an international insolvency

177. R. PERu, ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS GRANTED FOREIGN TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY (July 10, 1978)
(available in Law Library, Library of Congress); Nadelmann, supra note 62, at 39-40. "The speculation of some
writers - that the addition of "comity" as a separate heading was to allow consideration of other elements, such
as the existence of reciprocity in the foreign country - are on the right track." Id. at 38 (citing e.g., Honsberger,
Conflict of Laws and t6e Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CAse W. Res. L. REv. 631, 655 (1980); James,
InternationalBankruptcy: Limited Recognition in the New U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 3 Hous. J. INr'L L. 241, 260
(1981)). See Gitlin & Flaschen,supra note 10, at 323 (commenting that despite problems associated with Section
304, its enactment demonstrates a U.S. desire to aid foreign nations in administering their insolvency proceedings
which encourages reciprocal cooperation of those countries in future cases). "It was hoped that the inclusion of
a provision like Section 304 in the Code would provide an incentive for other countries to adopt similar
provisions which would ultimately lead to greater uniformity in the handling of international insolvencies."
Nielsen, supra note 51, at 574.
178. See, e.g., In re Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Koreag, 130 B.R. 705; In re Gerk, 122
B.R. 621 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991); In re Ernst & Young, 129 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Officina
Conti, S.R.L., 118 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989); In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1988); Interpool, 102 B.R. 373, appealdismissed, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Banco Nacional do Obras
y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C., 91 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Georg, 844 F.2d 1562, cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1034 (1989); In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674; In re
Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In
re Trackman, 33 B.R. 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd., 29 B.R. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983); In
re Toga, 28 B.R. 165; In re Egregaria Societa per Azioni de Navigazione, 26 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983),
rev'd on other ground-:sub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Nereide Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 28 B.R. 378
(E.D. Va. 1983), appealdismissedsub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Commissioner of Egeria Societa di Navigazione
per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1983); Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Egeria Socicta
per Azioni di Navigazione per Azioni, 28 B.R. 378 (E.D. Va. 1982), rev'dsub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Nercide
Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 28 B.R. 378 (E.D. Va. 1983), appealdismissed sub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A.
v. Commissioner of Egeria Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1983); In re Stuppel, 17
B.R. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1931); In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, S.A., 13 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re
Lineas Areas de Nicaragua S.A., 10 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Comstat Consulting Servs., 10 B.R.
134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Stuppel, 7 B.R. 341 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). See Booth supra note 18, at 170;
Nadelhann supra note 140, at 39-40.
See also Booth, supra note 18 at 170-71 (citing various cases in which § 304 is not controlling, but is
either discussed at length or relied on by analogy: In re A. Tarricone, Inc., 80 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Remmington Rand Coip.-Del. v. Business Sys., 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Enercons Virginia, Inc.,
812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir. 1987); Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 65 B.R. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987); Drexel Burnham Lambert, 777 F.2d 877; CunardSteamship, 773 F.2d 452;
In re Florida Peach Corp. of America, Int., 63 B.R. 833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); Norton, Lilly & Co. v. Cape
Lines, Ltd., 75 B.R. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); RBS Fabrics Ltd. v. G. Beckers & LeHanne, 24 B.R. 198 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.
1979). See also, Refo F/X Assocs v. Mebco Bank, S.A., 108 B.R. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Defendant commenced
a Section 304 proceeding to defeat plaintiffs motion to confirm an attachment. Id.
179. See generally Powers, supra note 11, at 3-9, 24.
180. Id
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system based on reciprocity and universality is preferable to the current system based on the
grab rule, or territoriality.' However, there is some disagreement as to whether the goal
of establishing a system of reciprocal universality is attainable and if so, what the proper
procedures are for achieving such a system." 2 Though bilateral and multilateral treaties
83
on the subject have been proposed in the past, this approach has been largely unsuccessful.
The proposal that would most likely be capable of achieving a world-wide system of
universality and reciprocity within the near future is MIICA.' 4 MIICA is a proposal for
model domestic legislation that contemplates a network ofreciprocity and cooperation while
limiting the complexity and formality of negotiations that have frustrated attempts to form
international agreements in the past.8 5
A.

Alternatives to MIICA: The Failureof InternationalInsolvency Treaty Proposals

Achieving cooperation among nations with respect to international insolvency policies
appears to be a proper subject for either a multilateral treaty or a series of bilateral
treaties.'8 6 However, this approach has generally failed.'87 Treaty proposals have been
unsuccessful for a variety of possible reasons. First, insolvency is perceived by most
societies as a private, local matter and large scale government involvement is generally not
contemplated.'88 Also, because no wars will be prevented, no revenue will be produced,
and no fundamental protections will be enhanced by composing an international insolvency
cooperation treaty, the government interest may not be high enough to justify the complex
89
Attempts to
and protracted negotiations that this type of agreement would entail.
persuade multinational businesses and lenders to support such proposals have been
unsuccessful because these entities feel that the risk of insolvency can be controlled by
proper management.1t9 Finally, attempts to draft agreements at a multilateral convention
may become unworkable because they require the resolution of so many issues and
policies.' 9,

181.
182.
183.

Id.
Ia. at 3-5, 18-21.
See Powers, supra note 11, at 19 n.71. Some of the most notable attempts at insolvency treaties

include: the Council of Europe Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (1990) (the
Strausburg Convention), an EEC draft bankruptcy convention (Draft, Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up,
Arrangements, Compositions and similar proceedings (1980), reprintedin 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6111
(Mar. 31, 1981), and a U.S.-Canada draft bilateral treaty (draft of U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, Oct. 29, 1979,
reprinted in 1 DALHUtISEN, supra, note 1, at app. D-6A-1 to 6A-13).
184. See MCA, supra note 6 (attached as Appendix A).
185. Id
186. Nadelmann, supra note 8, at 32-35 (discussing bilateral bankruptcy treaties and suggesting that the
United States has avoided the treaty field in this area for too long); Honsberger, supra note 61, at 634; Powers,
supra note 10, at 19; but see, 1 DALtUIsEN, supra note 1, Part IIl, §§ 2.03[5] 3-192-196, 2.05[7] 3-409-411.
Author criticizes the effectiveness of treaties as a vehicle for reform, suggesting that existing treaties have made
it more difficult to resolve situations outside the scope of these treaties. Id, pt. III, § 2.03[5] n.74.
187. See, e.g., Nadelmann, Clouds Over InternationalEfforts to Unify Rules of Conflicts of Laws, 41 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 54,62-64 (Spring 1977) [Nadelmana II]. See also 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 6,1016,221 (Mar. 3, 1981). European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Insolvency, art. 14, Eur. T.S.
No. 136 (1990) (establishing rebuttable presumption in favor of country of incorporation).
188. Powers, supra note 11, at 19.
189. Id.
190. Id
191. Id
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B.

The Development of MIICA: MultinationalDraftingshouldIncrease its Appeal

In the mid-1980's, rising world-wide frustration among lawyers, accountants, and
administrators involved with international insolvencies prompted a series of discussions
which eventually led to the drafting of a proposal for model legislation.1 92 Practitioners
held discussions at international insolvency institutes and meetings of the International Bar
Association (IBA) Committee L These practitioners agreed that the drafting and negotiating
of an international insolvency treaty would be a lengthy and potentially unsuccessful
process. 193 However, a consensus among the group believed that some method of
encouraging cooperation with respect to cross-border insolvencies needed to be
developed.' 94
There was already a common recognition that universality should govern international
insolvencies. 9 5 The group also shared the goal of a single global insolvency
administration and a commitment to protecting and marshalling the debtor's estate to provide
for equitable distribution to creditors everywhere.19 6 The group decided that the most
important types of relief that should be available to countries outside the site of the central
insolvency proceeding were: (1) the stay or dismissal of local proceedings; (2) the production
of records and access to testimony, (3) the turnover of assets, (4) the recognition and
enforcement of judgments and orders, and (5) the recognition of a representative of the
debtor's estate. 97
By early 1988, Subcommittee J1 (Subcommittee on International Cooperation)'9" was
established by Committee J of the IBA to draft a model statute that could be adopted as
domestic legislation in individual countries. This model statute was to provide a reciprocal
and unified method for handling international insolvencies.' 99 The countries that
participated in the drafting and editing of the latest version of MIICA 20 0 include:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, England, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Portugal, Scotland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland,
and the United States.2 1' Thus, the current draft of MIICA is not limited to the perspective

192.

Mears, supra note 4, at 28. Meetings at which seminal discussions occurred included: American Bar

Association National Institute on International Loan Workouts and Bankruptcies (New York City, 1985 and
1987); International Bar Association (IBA) Biennial Conference, Meeting of Committee J (Creditors' Rights,
Insolvency, Liquidation and Reorganization) (chaired by Ronald de Ruuk and John A. Barrett, New York City,
1986); IBA Section on Business Law Biennial Conference, Meeting of Committee J (chaired by John A. Barrett,
Buenos Aires, 1988). 1L
193. Mears, supra note 4, at 28.
194. Id.
195. Id
196. Id
197. Id
198. This group was originally chaired by John A. Barrett, London, England and is now headed by

Timothy Powers, Dallas, Texas, U.S.A.
199.

Mears, supra note 4, at 29.

200. MUCA, supra note 6 (attached as Appendix A).
201. Mears, supra note 4, at 29. The original country committees participating in the MUCA project were
from Australia, Canada, England, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Scotland,

Switzerland, and the United States. Id Commentators from Argentina, Brazil, France, Mexico, Portugal, South
Africa, and Spain influenced the latest draft of MUCA attached hereto at Appendix A. Id
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of one country or author.
MIICA.

2

This multinational drafting should increase the appeal for

C. The General Frameworkof MIICA-Including a Reciprocity Provision
MIICA consists of six sections which address three major topics: (1) the duties of a local
court to recognize and accommodate foreign insolvency proceedings; (2) the procedures for
providing such recognition and accommodation; and (3) a treaty override provision. 0 '
MIICA provides within each adopting jurisdiction, a provision similar to that embodied in
United States Bankruptcy Code section 304, with some variations.2" Specifically, MIICA
varies from section 304205 in that MIICA includes reciprocity,2"' choice of law,2"7 and
treaty override provisions.20 8
Section 1 of MIICA contains a reciprocity provision, not a reciprocity requirement.2"
Under this provision, a foreign representative from a country which has similarly enacted
MIICA will automatically be recognized by local courts.210 When foreign representatives
from countries who have not enacted MIICA seek recognition, the local court has the
discretionary power to grant recognition under MIICA section 1(b) and 1(c) by conducting
an analysis similar to that suggested by the United States Bankruptcy Code section
without necessarily penalizing
304(c). 211 This flexible provision encourages reciprocity
2 12
those countries which have not adopted MIICA.
D. Prospectsfor the World-Wide Adoption of MIICA
Critics of MIICA argue that the proposal fails to address certain issues such as: (1)
which countries are eligible to participate in the MUCA system; (2) local creditor protection;
(3) jurisdictional neutrality; (4) choosing the principal forum; and (5) the potential for
correlating foreign insolvency laws.2 3 However, despite these concerns, MIICA is the
most practical proposal for reforming the existing international insolvency system.21 4

202.

Id at 29.

203. MICA, supra note 6, attached hereto as Appendix A; Mears, supra note 10, at 30. For a survey of
MIICA's development, formation, and strategies for its implementation see, Somers, supra note 19, at 689-90
Cooperation,I INT'L
(citing Mears, Cross-BorderInsolvencies in the 21st Century: A ProposalforInternational
INSOL. 1L 23, 30 (1991), Leonard, Carfagnini, and McLaren, Can There Be InternationalCo-operation in
Foreign Bankruptcies?A CanadianExamination of Some Alternative Models, 3 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 23,40 n.36
(1989)).
204. Joseph, supra note 2, at 739.
205. See Joseph, supra note 2, at 740-41 (outlining differences between section 304 and MIICA).
206. MHCA, supra note 6, §§ 1, 2.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. § 4.
Id. § 7.
1&. § 1.
1&§ 1(a).
Id. § 1(b)-(c).
Id.

Mears, supra note 4, at 17; Somers, supra note 19, at 692-93 (citing Westbrook, GLOBAL
INSOLVENCIES IN A WoRLD OF NATIONS 1, 18 (1990) (unpublished manuscript on file at the offices of the
American University Journal of International Law and Policy).
214. Joseph, supra note 2, at 739-42; Mears, supra note 4, at 37-38; Somers, supra note 19, at 700-02.
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Countries currently considering the adoption of MUCA legislation include: Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Scotland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United States,
and Uruguay." 5 If a sizeable number of trading nations were to adopt MIICA, this would
be a substantial step towards establishing a network of reciprocal international insolvency
cooperation.2 16 However, drafters of MIICA acknowledge that the support of local
practitioners in adapting MIICA to local laws will determine whether and to what extent
MIICA is adopted. 217 According to Rona R. Mears, a member of the Subcommittee on
International Cooperation, "[t]he vision of universality-and a conviction that MIICA has a
role in making it a worldwide reality-is one that must be held by insolvency practitioners
in many countries of the world, if the MIICA project is to succeed."21
VI. THE PIVOTAL ROLES OF COURTS AND PRACIMONERS IN
ACHIEVING A SYSTEM OF RECIPROCAL UNIVERSALITY

Some practitio ners believe that the chance of harmonizing international insolvency laws
was lost years ago, when negotiators under the Carter administration failed to establish a
United States-Canada Insolvency Treaty,2" 9 despite similar legal structures.22 However,
the drafting process of MIICA itself suggests that practitioners around the world are taking
the need for reform seriously and perhaps more importantly, that they are willing to
cooperate. Nonetheless, so far MIICA has not been adopted as domestic legislation by any
country.22'
The use of section 304 by foreign practitioners provides an opportunity to test the
universality theory. Therefore, the fact that section 304 is gaining recognition without
sacrificing the interests of local creditors, even without a reciprocity requirement, is
extremely encouraging.
However, since section 304 recognizes foreign insolvency proceedings without
considering reciprocity, it may be viewed as unfair to local U.S. creditors.222 At the same
time, trustees representing U.S. debtors are denied similar ancillary recognition from foreign
governments. Furthermore, the benefits of universality, including Transactional Gain and
Rough Wash economic gains, are only realized if a critical mass of trading nations adopt
universality reciprocally." 3
If a reciprocity provision is not incorporated into section 304 it is possible that
bankruptcy courts will react by severely restricting section 304 to only those countries that

215. Letter, in response to telephone interview, from Timothy E.Powers, February 22, 1993 (copy of
correspondence on file and available on request from The Transnational Lawyer, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific).
216. Mears, supra note 4, at 36.
217. Id at 37.
218. Id
219. Draft of U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, Oct. 29,1979, reprintedin2DALHUsENsupra note 1,app.
D-6A-1 to 6A-13. See generally,ExplanatoryNotes on the Draft Treaty, 2 DALHUSENsupra note 4, app. D-6A,
at D-6A-18 to D-6A-241; 2 L HOULDEN & C. MoRAWT7, Q.C., BANKRUPTCY LAW OF CANADA (1986).
220. Sontag, supra note 44, at 19.
221. Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 349; Letter, supra note 215.
222. Id
223. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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either adopt U.S. bankruptcy law principles or enter into treaties with the United States.'
This would result in a gradual backslide into preaching universality while practicing
territoriality.
Though reciprocity provisions must be enforced with diplomatic restraint, resort to such
considerations is nothing new.' In fact, in 1977, Professor Kurt Nadelmann argued that
a reciprocity requirement was a "first step toward rehabilitation of international bankruptcy
law." 6
Two preliminary steps are suggested for achieving a system of international insolvency
based on reciprocal universality. First, both foreign and domestic insolvency practitioners
can encourage adopting MIICA, or similar domestic legislation, within their countries. In
the meantime, as discussed, in Part II, courts in the United States can apply section 304(c)
to facilitate reciprocal universality.sa 7 However, one weakness with this approach is that
a case-by-case consideration of reciprocity issues could further decrease the ability offoreign
practitioners to predict results in any given section 304 proceeding.
The United States should adopt MIICA. Adopting MIICA would provide reciprocity,
choice of law, and treaty override provisions while demonstrating a spirit of international
cooperation. Adoption of MIICA would involve only minimal changes and additions to the
Bankruptcy Code and would clearly promote reciprocity." Now that foreign practitioners
have realized the benefits of ancillary proceedings, 229 the United States is in a better
position to strongly encourage reciprocity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Creating a coherent system for resolving international insolvency proceedings is long
overdue. The need for reform in this area is widely recognized. However, because of its
inherent complexity, progress has not been easily achieved. If a cooperative effort between
the judiciary, the legislature, and domestic and foreign practitioners is coordinated, the lofty
goal of achieving a system of cooperative reciprocity and universality could become a
reality.
MIICA is a practical solution for achieving an international insolvency system based on
reciprocal universality. However, M11CA has not been enacted to date. Therefore, this

224. Powers & Mears, supra note 10, at 349.
225. Nadelmann, supra note 6, at 35. "The principle of equal treatment of all creditors is embodied in our
Bankruptcy Act as an underlying policy. This principle remains unaffected if, as I now propose, a reciprocity
requirement is established for the admission of nondomestic claims in proceedings against nonresident debtors
based on presence of assets. As under present law, all claims would be treated equally under my proposal, but
with the added qualification that for claims of nondomiciliaries not payable in the United States, admission on
equal terms would depend upon the possibility of securing the equal distribution of local assets under the law
(including treaty law) of the country of the foreign adjudication." L See Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal
Aspects ofa PerennialIdea, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 619 (1954); Arthur Lenhoff, Reciprocity in Function:A Problem
of Conflict of Laws, ConstitutionalLaw, and InternationalLaw, 15 U. PIT. L REV.44 (1953).
226. Nadelmann, supra note 8, at 35.
227. See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
228. See generally U.S. Working Group, Committee J: Creditors' Rights, Insolvency, Liquidation &
Reorganization, Amendments to UnitedStates Bankruptcy Law Required to Incorporatethe Model International
Insolvency CooperationAct (MIICA) Approved by the InternationalBar Association andStrategiesforAchieving
Enactment,Presented at International Bar Association, Business Law Section, Biennial Conference, Strasbourg,
France, (Oct. 4, 1989).
229. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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Comment suggests a method for facilitating the adoption of MIICA in the United States by
first utilizing existing U.S. law to encourage reciprocity and universality.
The recommendations of this Comment should be pursued cautiously. Courts must not
apply strict reciprocity requirements in order to favor local creditors. Such an approach
could lead to a backslide into territoriality and retaliation, instead ofcooperation, by foreign
governments. In asense, such an approach would "throw the baby out with the bathwater,"
that is, the paramount policy of universality could be sacrificed if strict reciprocity
requirements are employed. Instead, the need for reciprocity must be enunciated in terms
of macroeconomic pragmatism.
Despite the dangers associated with this approach, one cannot ignore the fact that
unilateral universality makes no economic sense for the recognizing forum. Without
reciprocity local creditors are subjected to added costs, inconvenience, and delay without any
offsetting gain. Instead ofjust hoping for spontaneous reciprocity, this Comment suggests
a vehicle for addressing the issue of reciprocity, until MIICA is enacted. Perhaps now that
the benefits of universality have been realized by foreign representatives through section
304, the United States is in a better position to acknowledge that reciprocity is necessary to
achieving universality.
Tandi Armstrong Panuska

1993 / Achieving Reciprocal Universality Under Section 304 or MIICA
APPENDIX A

PROPOSAL FOR CONSULTATIVE DRAFT OF'

Model InternationalInsolvency
Co-OperationAct forAdoption by

Domestic Legislation With or Without Modiflcation
Preparedby members ofSBL Committee J (Creditors'Rights,Insolvency, Liquidationand
Reorganizations)
Subcommittee on InternationalCo-Operationin Bankruptcy Proceedings
Introduction
The concept of a Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act (MIICA) received its
initial impetus at the meeting of SBL Committee J (Creditors' Rights, Insolvency,
Liquidation and Reorganizations) during the Biennial Conference in New York in September
1986. Subsequently, Country Groups comprised of Committee J members were established
in several countries and theses groups, through their Country Chairmen, reported on the
concept at the SBL's London conference in September 1987. The discussion and
consideration given to the concept in New York and in London led to the development of the
Model International Insolvency Co-Operation Act. No other organization or country is
drafting and proposing such a model provision.
The "Consultative Draft of MIICA for Adoption by Domestic Legislation With or
Without Modification" is a model statute, proposed for adoption in jurisdictions throughout
the world, that provides mechanisms by which courts may assist and act in aid of insolvency
proceedings being conducted in otherjurisdictions. The fundamental principle underlying
MIICA is universality which envisions a single administration of the insolvent debtor's
estate, providing protection of the estate and an equitable distribution of assets among both
domestic and foreign creditors in liquidation, or equitable administration in a reorganization
or rehabilitation proceeding. It is contemplated that the Consultative Draft of IvICA may
be adopted with considerable modification in order to be effectively integrated with existing
domestic legislation in some countries.
An initial draft of MIICA was submitted to designated Country Chairmen for comment
in February 1988 and was revised as of 1 July 1988 in response to these comments.
Thereafter, at the meeting of Committee J during the IBA's Biennial Conference in Buenos
Aires in September 1988, additional comments on MIICA and the prospects for its adoption
were submitted in reports given by Country Chairmen. A few additional revisions to MIICA
were agreed, resulting in the third draft dated 1 November 1988. In Buenos Aires,
Committee J determined to submit MIICA to the Councils of the International Bar
Association and the Section on Business Law for approval at their meetings in Helsinki, 9
and 10 June 1989, prior to commencing the task of implementing jurisdictional adoption to
designated members of Committee J. We are happy to report that the third draft of MICA
which follows was approved by both councils.
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John A. Barrett,Fulbright & Jaworski, London, Chairman, Committee J; Timothy
E. Powers, Haynes & Boone, Dallas, Texas, Chairman, Committee J,
Subcommittee on International Co-operation in Bankruptcy Proceedings

Third Draft
1 November 1988;

MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY COOPERATION ACT
Section 1.
In all matters of insolvency, including bankruptcy, liquidation, composition,
reorganization or comparable matters, a Court, in accordance with the provisions of this Act,
(a) shall recognize a foreign representative of the debtor or estate, provided that such
foreign representative complies with the other orders of such Court;
(b) shall act it aid of and be auxiliary to foreign proceedings pending in the courts of
all other countries that provide substantially similar treatment for foreign insolvencies as that
provided by this Act; and
(c) shall act in aid of and be auxiliary to foreign proceedings pending in the courts of all
other countries, if the Court is satisfied that:
(i) the court or administrative agency having jurisdiction over the foreign
representative is a proper and convenient forum to supervise administration of
the property of the debtor; and
(ii) the administration of the property of the debtor in the pertinent jurisdiction by
the foreign representative is in the overall interests of the creditors of the
debtor.
Section 2.
(a) A foreign representative may commence a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding by
filing a petition under this Act for purposes of:
(i) obtaining an order to turn over to the foreign representative any property of the
debtor or the estate in this jurisdiction;
(ii) staying or dismissing any action or proceeding concerning the debtor or estate
in this jurisdiction;
(iii) obtaining testimony or production of books, records or other documents
relating to an insolvency;
(iv) obtaining recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment of court order;
or
(v) obtaining any other appropriate relief.
The Court may exercise such additional powers with respect to the matter as it could exercise
if the matter had arisen within its own jurisdiction.
(b) Upon the commencement of an ancillary case, any currently pending related
insolvency proceedings in this jurisdiction shall be consolidated with such an ancillary case.
Section 3.
In the event that ancillary proceedings pursuant to Section 2 are unavailable or denied,
a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning a person, may
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commence an insolvency proceeding against such a person in this jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions of the applicable laws of this jurisdiction.
Section 4.
(a) In any case commenced ancillary to a foreign proceeding as provided in Section 2,
a Court shall apply the substantive insolvency law of the foreign court having jurisdiction
over the foreign proceeding, unless after due consideration to principles of private
international law and conflict of laws, the Court determines that it must apply the substantive
insolvency law of this jurisdiction.
(b) A Court shall apply the substantive insolvency law of this jurisdiction in any
insolvency proceeding brought by a foreign representative as provided in Section 3.
Section 5.
An appearance in a Court by a foreign representative in connection with a petition or
request under this Act does not submit such foreign representative to the jurisdiction of any
Court in this jurisdiction for any other purpose.
Section 6.
(a) "Foreign representative" means a person who, irrespective ofdesignation, is assigned
under the laws of a country outside of this jurisdiction to perform functions in connection
with a foreign proceeding that are equivalent to those performed by a trustee, liquidator,
administrator, sequestrator, receiver, receiver-manager or other representative of a debtor or
an estate of a debtor in this jurisdiction.
(b) "Foreign proceeding" means an insolvency proceeding, whether judicial or
administrative, in a foreign country, provided that the foreign court or administrative agency
conducting the proceeding has proper jurisdiction over the debtor and its estate.
Section 7.
Any treaty or convention governing matters of insolvency cooperation, which has been
ratified by this country and the country in which a foreign proceeding is pending, shall
override this Act with regard to such matter between such countries, unless the treaty or
convention shall otherwise provide.
Third Draft
1 November 1988

OFFICIAL COMMENT TO MODEL INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY COOPERATION ACT
Statement of General Principles
The ultimate goal of model legislation for international insolvency cooperation is
universality which envisions a single administration providing protection of the insolvent
debtor's estate from dismemberment, and an equitable distribution of assets among both
domestic and foreign creditors in liquidation, or the equitable administration of the estate in
a reorganization, composition or rehabilitation proceeding. Insofar as possible, such
universality should be the guiding principle of all efforts toward international insolvency
cooperation, for it alone is truly compatible with the realization of equal treatment of all
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creditors, debtors, assets and liabilities, and the swift and effective administration of the
estate. Within the parameters of this overarching principle, mechanisms must be provided
for the recognition of foreign representatives, the stay of local proceedings, the production
of documents and testimony, the integration of asset distribution and other forms of ancillary
relief. In a world of increasing global integration and growth of true multinational business
entities, these principles are the indispensable elements in attainting equity and fairness in
international insolvency proceedings.
Statutory Comments
Section 1.
Purposes. The purposes of Section 1 are to provide assurance and predictability that the
foreign representative will be recognized by the Court; to require the foreign representative
to comply with orders of the Court; to ensure that the Court will aid foreign proceedings in
countries where a form of the model act (or similar legislation) has been adopted; and 'to
encourage the Court to aid foreign proceedings in other countries, where the model act has
not been adopted, provided that only two limited basic qualifications are satisfied.
Sources. Subsection 1(a) is derived from principles found in provisions of the laws of
England (case law) and the United States Bankruptcy Code sections 304(a) and 306.
Subsections 1(b) and (c) are sinmilarinform to subsections 29(2)(a) and (b) of the provisions
of international insolvencies included in two recent bankruptcy bills introduced, but not
adopted, in Canada. (the "Canada Bill"). The omission of a third qualification in the
Canadian Bill was based upon comments in Report of the Canadian Committee - Special
Project on International Cooperation in Bankruptcy Proceedings, IBA/SBL Committee J,
1987 (the Canadian Report) at pp. 46-47.
Explanation. S action 1 supplies a foundation for the entire model act and its principle
of universality by providing for recognition of foreign representatives, and by providing that
the Court shall act in aid of and by auxiliary to foreign proceedings in all matters of
insolvency. The scope of matters is sufficiently broad to include debtor rehabilitation as well
as liquidation. The terms "in aid of" and "auxiliary to" clearly set forth the ideal rule of the
Court in relation to foreign proceedings, and the recognition of the foreign representative
establishes the point of entry in to the Court for that proceeding and its representative.
Subsection 1(a) requires the Court to recognize foreign representatives so that, even though
the Court may have discretion in responding to the requests ofthe foreign representative, that
representative is assured of recognition in order to place the request before the Court. The
sole qualification to such recognition is that the foreign representative must comply with any
Court orders; the Court could withdraw recognition if the foreign representative did notso
comply.
Subsection 1(b) requires the Court to act in aid of and be auxiliary to courts in countries
which have adopted the model act. This reciprocity provision will provide an incentive for
countries to adopt the model act, or substantially similar treatment, so that its representatives
will have a basis for depending upon receipt of aid in those jurisdictions which have likewise
adopted the model act.
Subsection 1(c) provides that the Court shall provide aid to courts of countries which
have not adopted the model act, but which satisfy two fundamental qualifications: that the
foreign proceeding is a proper and convenient forum and that administration in that
proceeding is in the overall interests of the general body of creditors of the debtor. Such

1993 /Achieving Reciprocal Universality Under Section 304 or MIICA
qualifications in no way provide special consideration for local parties, but rather establish
a basic threshold of fundamental fairness and equity which is central to the concept of
international insolvency cooperation. Certain additional factors which would arguably
provide the Court with greater discretion to deny aid to the foreign proceeding, such as those
found in United States Bankruptcy Code section 304 and Canadian Bill section 316(5), have
not been included in the model act. Such omission is in response to commentaries received
from a number of jurisdictions which criticize the United States provision for giving too
much discretion to the Court by enumerating multiple factors which the Court may consider,
and thus allowing many alternatives for determining to deny aid to foreign proceedings.
Section 1 generally raises the issue of whether a Court would act in aid of and by
auxiliary to foreign proceedings with regard to recognition and enforcement of foreign
revenue (tax) or general claims that are not currently recognized or enforced in many
jurisdictions. The resolution of the issue must be left to the individualjurisdictions adapting
the model act for adoptions.***(Check original)
Section 2.
Purposes. The purposes of Section 2 are to provide the framework for aid to a foreign
proceeding by establishing the mechanism of a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding, in
which the foreign representative may seek several types of relief; to forth four of the most
commonly sought types of assistance which foreign representatives may request; to ensure
flexibility by allowing the foreign representative in an ancillary case to obtain any other
appropriate relief in addition to the four enumerated types of aid; and to provide that any
separate related proceedings pending in the jurisdiction shall be consolidated with the
ancillary case.
Sources. Section 2 is similar conceptually and in form to section 304 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code, which similarly provides for cases ancillary to foreign proceedings
without the commencement of separate bankruptcy proceedings. The model act deviates
significantly from section 304, however, by omitting the six factors to be considered by the
Courts in determining whether to grant ancillary judicial assistance. No such factors are set
forth in Section 2 of the model act. Such omission responds to the criticism of some
bankruptcy practitioners that section 304, as currently enacted, provides too much discretion
to the Court by setting forth such criteria. Instead, the model act enumerates the types of aid
which the foreign representative may seek in the ancillary case, once the Court has
determined to act in aid of the foreign proceeding in accordance with the limited guidelines
set out in Section 1. The specific types of relief listed are derived from the comments of
bankruptcy practitioners in response to the Special Project on International Cooperation and
Bankruptcy Proceedings, IBA Committee J, 1987, and from certain statutory and other
sources. Subsections 2(a), (b) and (c) are similar to types of relief enumerated in the
Canadian Bill at section 316(3). Subsection 2(d) is derived from the Federal Statute on
Private International Law Tenth Chapter: Bankruptcy and Composition of Law of
Switzerland, articles 159 ff, and was stressed along with subsection 2(a) by the Switzerland
Commentary on the Special Project on International Insolvency Cooperation and Bankruptcy
Proceedings, IBA/SBL Committee J, 1987.
Explanation. Whereas some statutes provide that foreign representatives may "seek
orders," others provide that foreign representatives may "obtain recognition of foreign
decrees," or may "seek necessary relief." Such provisions do not provide a flexible
framework within which foreign representatives may obtain aid of many types and in many
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different forms, depending upon the needs which are generated by the foreign proceeding.
The United States model of the "case ancillary to a foreign proceeding, "provides just a such
flexible mechanism within which the foreign representative may then take any number of
actions and seek any number of different types of relief depending upon the particular needs
of the estate. In addition, the concept of an "ancillary case" reemphasizes the universality
principle by distinguishing this special type of case allowed for the particular purposes of
aiding and being auxiliary to the foreign proceeding which remains the dominant and central
administration for the debtor's estate. The enumeration of types of relief to be sought
provides a starting point, based largely upon comments of bankruptcy practitioners with
regard to the goals which foreign representatives are likely to bring to the ancillary case. The
four enumerated types of relief will cover a very significant portion of the actions sought in
ancillary cases, but Subsection 2(a)(v) provides additional flexibility to the foreign
representative to seek any other kind of appropriate relief. The last sentence of Subsection
2(a) provides the Court with full powers to provide relief and act in aid of the foreign
representative and the foreign proceeding; however, this provision is not intended to provide
the Court with discretion to favor local creditors or other local parties in interest. Subsection
2(b) is based upon recognition that creditors or other parties in interest may commence either
involuntary insolvency proceedings or related judicial or administrative proceedings in the
recognizing jurisdiction, prior to the commencement of a case ancillary to a foreign
proceeding. A foreign representative has the discretion to either allow such action to
proceed, or to commence a case ancillary to the foreign proceeding, in which case, under the
terms of subsection 2(b), the separate proceeding brought by the creditor or other party in
interest shall e consolidated with the ancillary case. Upon such consolidation with the
ancillary case, the separate proceeding will be fully integrated into a single administration
of the estate, and will be governed by the provisions of the model act. It is the intent of this
provision to allow consolidation of any future actions similarly brought, following
commencement of the ancillary cases.(?)
Section 3.
Purposes. The purposes of Section 3 are to provide a further means for foreign
representatives to enter the Court and seek relief, if the ancillary case is unavailable or is
denied by the Court; and to ensure the broadest possible access of the foreign representative
to the Court by allowing a full proceeding to be commenced in accordance with the laws of
the Court's jurisdiction in the event that such proceeding is deemed necessary.
Sources. The United States Bankruptcy Code section 303(b)(4) similarly allows a
foreign representative to commence full proceedings in the United States. The Canadian
Report and P.46 strongly recommends such a provision and commends the United States
Bankruptcy Code for so providing.
Explanation. The primary thrust of the model act is toward a central administration of
the estate in one jurisdiction with ancillary cases in other jurisdictions as necessary.
However, in the event that the Court declines to act in aid of a foreign proceeding and
refuses to allow an ancillary case (under the provisions of 1(c)), this Section provides the
foreign representative with an alternative course in which a full proceeding may be
commenced against the debtor in accordance with the domestic provisions of the applicable
statute of the jurisdiction.. Section 3 has been drafted to clearly indicate the necessity of the
foreign representative first considering and seeking to obtain ancillary relief under Section
2, and only in the event that it is unavailable, proceeding to initiate a full proceeding under
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Section 3. This construction further buttresses the universality principle and the emphasis
which the model act places upon a centrad administration.
Section 4.
Purposes. The purposes of Section 4 are to provide guidance to the Court with regard to the
applicable substantive insolvency law for proceedings under the model act; to distinguish
between the ancillary case and the full proceedings, by providing that the substantive
insolvency law of either the foreign or local jurisdiction may be applied in the ancillary case
whereas the substantive law of the local jurisdiction is applicable to the full proceedings; to
encourage recognition of the law of the foreign jurisdiction insofar as possible in ancillary
cases, but to provide for the possibility that such law may be improper in the local
jurisdiction and thus not be subject to being utilized; and to further confirm that a full
bankruptcy proceeding initiated by the foreign representative is subject to the substantive
insolvency law of the local jurisdiction and that such law will be applicable law for the full
proceeding.
Sources. Subsection 4(a) reflects a principle noted in the English Commentary to the
Special Project on International Cooperation and Bankruptcy Proceedings, IBA/SBL
Committee J, 1987 regarding Section 426 or the Insolvency Act 1986 of England.
Subsection 4(b) sets forth the generally accepted principle of utilizing local substantive law
when the benefits of a full local proceeding are sought by the person initiating the
proceeding.
Explanation. It is clear that if a foreign representative has been denied the assistance
of the Court in initiating an ancillary case, and has initiated a full bankruptcy proceeding
under the laws of the local jurisdiction, then the applicable substantive law should be that of
the local jurisdiction. In an ancillary case, the issue of applicable substantive law is more
complex. Ideally, following the principle of universality in its purest form, the substantive
law of the foreign court would govern the entire proceedings, including ancillary cases,
whereas procedural matters would presumably be governed in the ancillary cases by the
procedural laws of the recognizingjurisdiction. However, the constraints of public policy
or strongly supported local bankruptcy principles in the Court's own jurisdiction, may
require that this basic principle be modified and, in some instances, that local substantive law
be applied. The intention of the model act is that the Court should, whenever possible in
ancillary cases, apply the substantive insolvency law of the jurisdiction of the foreign
proceeding, and that the application of local substantive insolvency law should only occur
in isolated and infrequent instances when the application of the substantive insolvency law
of the foreign proceeding would violate public policy.
Section 5.
Purposes. The purpose of Section 5 is to allow a foreign representative to appear in the
Court for the limited purposes of obtaining ancillary relief without the fear of being subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court for other purposes.
Sources. Section 5 is patterned closely afterUnited States Bankruptcy Code section 306.
Explanation. In order to encourage foreign representatives to seek ancillary relief by
initiating cases ancillary to the foreign proceeding, or, if necessary, to initiate a full
proceeding, this section provides protection for foreign representatives from the Court
assuming jurisdiction for other purposes. Such protection is limited to actions of the foreign
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representative prior to the commencement of the ancillary proceeding, and is not intended
to prevent subjecting the foreign representative to claims or counterclaims validly raised
after commencement of the ancillary proceeding. The intention of the model act is not only
to provide access to the Court for the foreign representative, but to provide an efficient,
equitable and safe mechanism for the foreign representative to use, in order to encourage a
central administration ofthe estate and to foster the principle of universality. The protections
which this section affords the foreign representative are important aspects of this effort.
Section 6.
Purposes. The purposes of Section 6 are to define "foreign representative" and "foreign
proceeding" clearly; to frame such definitions with sufficient flexibility to cover the various
types of proceedings and the various roles which administrators may play under the laws of
a variety ofjurisdictions; and to allocate to the Court responsibility for determining that there
is proper jurisdiction in the foreign proceeding.
Sources. The definition set forth in Section 6(a) is closely patterned after section 316(1)
of the Canadian Bill. The definition set forth in Section 6(b) is derived in part from United
States Bankruptcy Code section 101(22).
Explanation. It is the intention of the model act to include within the term "foreign
representative" at subsection 6(a) all ofthose persons who perform substantially equivalent
functions in a foreign insolvency. Note, for instance, that the breadth of this definition
allows it to include such unique concepts as the "debtor-in-possession" under the provisions
of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
Subsection 6(b) defines "foreign proceeding" with sufficient breadth to include all types
of judicial and administrative proceedings that exist in jurisdictions throughout the world.
"Foreign proceeding" does not include private non-judicial receiverships or similar actions
that are not under the control of a judicial or administrative body. To meet the definition of
"foreign proceeding" under the model act, the foreign court or agency conducting the
proceedings must have properjurisdiction. Determination that properjurisdiction exists, and
therefore that a proceeding is a "foreign proceeding" under the terms of the model act must
be made by the Court. An underlying assumption of the model act is that the Court, guided
by a forum non-conveniens approach, would concede jurisdiction to the foreign court or
administrative agency in ajurisdictionhaving greater contacts with the debtor that its estate.
In making itsjurisdictional determination, the Court should be accorded maximum flexibility
so that, for instance, it may consider whether improper forum selection or "shopping" has
occurred in the choice of forum made by the debtor.
Section 7.
Purposes. The purposes of Section 7 are to recognize that treaties or conventions may be
adopted and ratified to govern the subject matter of the model act, and to provide that in such
instance, the treaty or conventions shall override the model act with regard to international
insolvency matters between ratifying countries.
Sources. Section 7 was drafted in response to comments of bankruptcy practitioners,
some of whom advocate the adoption and ratification of treaties or conventions to effect
international insolvency cooperation, and some of whom simply seek to clarify the relation
of such treaty and the model act in those instances in which a treaty or convention is ratified
following the enactment of the model act.
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Explanation. Section 7 provides that if a treaty or convention is effected with regard
to international insolvency cooperation, it will override the model act with regard to such
matters between the ratifying countries. This new provision explicitly recognizes that
bilateral or multilateral treaties or conventions may be effected as alternative means for
establishing arrangements concerning international insolvency cooperation between
countries. Enactment of the model act is not to be construed as prohibiting or deterring the
adoption and ratification of such treaties or conventions; on the contrary, Section 7 explicitly
addresses the issue of how to reconcile the later ratification of such a treaty be a country
which has previously adopted the model act.
Miscellaneous Comments
1. Meaning of "insolvency". The term "insolvency" has been used in the title of the
model act, and throughout the text and official comment, to mean all of those various
proceedings under all types of law in various jurisdictions worldwide, applicable to actions
regarding financial failure generally, including insolvency bankruptcy, reorganization,
composition, rehabilitation and any other such proceeding by whatever name.
2. Venue. A provision governing venue with respect to cases commenced ancillary to
a foreign proceeding has not been included in the model act. It is presumed that venue will
be determined by the Court in accordance with the applicable laws of the Court's
jurisdiction.
3. Effects of multi-jurisdictional distribution. Although no marshalling provision has
been included in the model act, the principles of universality and single insolvency
administration dictate an equitable worldwide distribution. Thus, if a creditor receives
payment or other satisfaction of a claim in a foreign proceeding, such creditor should not
receive any payment in the Court's jurisdiction until other holders ofclaims who are entitled
to share equally with such creditor, have received payment equal in value to the
consideration already received by the creditor in the foreign proceeding. This comment is
derived substantially from United States Bankruptcy Code section 508(a).

